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ABSTRACT 
Due to instability in Africa and the Middle East, Denmark’s political commitment 
to deploy troops to stabilize fragile regions is not expected to decrease in the near future. 
The political ambition for Denmark is to conduct stabilization efforts through military 
capacity building under the framework of shape-secure-develop. This requires targeting 
both the physical and the cognitive domains. For Denmark to sustain long-term 
stabilization operations, different approaches to integrate and synchronize the efforts of 
both conventional forces and special operations forces must be explored. This capstone 
makes use of two different conceptual scenarios: one of conflict prevention and one of 
conflict intervention. With conflict prevention, we contend that conventional forces and 
special operations forces should be fully integrated across doctrine, organization, and 
technology, and predominantly advise, mentor, and train local forces. With conflict 
intervention, military forces should predominantly partner and assist local forces through 
operational mentoring liaison teams and village stability operations. This capstone makes 
additional recommendations related to doctrine, organization, and technology, as well as 
education and training. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Denmark’s involvement in stabilization operations is expected to continue in the 
future. The prioritized regions will be Africa and the Middle East since these regions’ 
fragile states pose a threat to Danish and European security interests. However, the focus 
will likely shift from large-scale military interventions toward conflict prevention. The 
military’s primary task will be to provide a safe and secure environment for non-military 
actors, emphasizing local sustainable solutions. 
Building military institutions and units is a key component of this process. The 
local military needs to be in charge and interact with the local population, thereby 
legitimizing the local government and stabilizing the country. This means a small foreign 
military footprint and requires that foreign military advisors have good cultural knowledge, 
can operate with only limited support, and have a thorough understanding of the military’s 
role as just one element in a comprehensive approach. Traditionally, special operations 
forces have been used for these types of missions. However, over the past decade, 
conventional forces have been used for certain military capacity building tasks and have 
gained experience with these types of missions. This overlap of mission sets between 
conventional forces and special operations forces should now be used to improve military 
capacity building and make long-term missions more sustainable by deploying a mix of 
conventional forces and special operations forces. 
Two different scenarios are described in order to come up with a “way ahead” for 
military capacity building. The overall doctrinal solution in both scenarios is based on a 
“shape-secure-develop” strategy and should include both kinetic and non-kinetic effects. 
One scenario focuses on conflict prevention, while the other scenario focuses on conflict 
intervention. The scenarios are interconnected, since a successful conflict intervention 
should eventually evolve into conflict prevention.  
Military capacity building in a conflict prevention scenario is best addressed via full 
integration, in which different units or individuals are integrated and merged into a task 
force. For a conflict intervention scenario, the best solution is task assignment, in which 
 xvi
units stay organizationally intact and conduct different missions while still working to 
achieve a common overall objective. 
To successfully conduct military capacity building, the Danish Armed Forces must 
be capable of both responses. In terms of doctrine, organization, and technology task 
assignment seems to align well with current Danish Armed Forces’ capabilities while full 
integration appears to present a challenge. The following recommendations could help 
address this challenge. 
 Practical and theoretical training and education about military capacity building 
should be methodically integrated into the Danish military educational system at 
all levels for both officers and non-commissioned officers.  
 Joint seminars and courses on military capacity building should be offered 
frequently to disseminate knowledge and ensure common understanding of 
doctrine and procedures. 
 Joint military capacity building training exercises, including both conventional 
and special operations forces, should be conducted on a regular basis to ensure a 
common understanding of settings, doctrine, and planning according to the shape-
secure-develop doctrine. The focus should be on those of the staff level. 
 A joint center of excellence in military capacity building should be created. This 
center should collect and maintain experiences, coordinate efforts between the 
services and commands, and provide military guidance on military capacity 
building to senior military and political decision makers. 
 Personnel for military capacity building should be individually selected based on 
criteria that relate to their advisory role.  
 A dedicated joint unit to conduct military capacity building should be created. 
 A database of personnel with capacity building qualifications should be created. 
On request and demand, personnel with the right qualifications can be designated 
for stabilization and capacity building missions. 
 Unit deployment cycles and deployment durations have to be aligned between the 
services, which is especially important in full integration missions. 
 
These recommendations are solely focused on how to improve Danish military 
capacity building. They do not take into account the effects that their implementation will 
have on other of the Danish Armed Forces’ tasks. Separate studies on these effects should 
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PREFACE 
The purpose of this capstone is to provide solutions so that conventional forces 
and special operations forces can better integrate and synchronize efforts to achieve 
regional stabilization through military capacity building. The idea for this study came 
about as a response to the lack of integration and synchronization between conventional 
forces and special operations forces based on our personal experiences during previous 
deployments. Attending the postgraduate program at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California, has given us the time and opportunity to address this challenge. 
This capstone was written in close collaboration among the three of us.  
The capstone presents a number of concepts and solutions of a generalizable 
nature, but is mainly focused on Danish interests and how the Danish Armed Forces can 
better integrate and synchronize conventional forces and special operations forces in 
military capacity building to achieve better solutions at lower costs. We have kept the 
project at a conceptual level in order to provide generalizable knowledge that can be 
utilized in a broad number of situations. By choosing this approach, we sought to be 
broad rather than country- or location-specific. Additional studies will be required if our 
ideas are to be operationalized. It is especially important to understand that the ideas and 
concepts presented in this capstone can only work if they are adapted to the specific 
countries involved and the context in which a military capacity building mission takes 
place.  
In order to reach the broadest possible audience, this capstone has been kept 
unclassified, using only open-source information. More accurate classified data might 
exist, but will not affect the overall presented solutions. Because the capstone is intended 
for a Danish audience, we have chosen to use the analytical model developed by 
Lieutenant Colonel K. V. Nielsen of Denmark, which displays the interdependence 
between doctrine, organization, and technology. NATO uses the more elaborate model of 
Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel, Facilities 
and Interoperability (DOTMLPFI). In order to simplify the capstone and make it more 
accessible to the reader, we have chosen to subsume the categories covered by 
 xx
DOTMLPFI under doctrine, organization and technology in Lieutenant Colonel K.V. 
Nielsen’s model. Furthermore, we have chosen to avoid the question of strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels, since this can open up an area of discussion that is 
irrelevant to the solutions presented. Finally, this capstone is written at a United States 
university and is therefore subject to the spelling and grammar of American English. 
However, the Danish Defence utilizes British spelling and grammar. Therefore, names of 
Danish institutions and units are spelled using British spelling, for example Danish 
Defence Command. 
 
We sincerely hope that you will enjoy reading the capstone and that you find the 
proposed solutions significant. 
 






I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCING THE STUDY 
The vast majority of wars thus far in the 21st century have been fought within 
states.1 Although wars between states cannot be ruled out, there is little evidence pointing 
to a future change of the current general picture. At the same time, big interventionary 
counterinsurgency operations, as experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan, may be over for a 
while.2 The enormous quantity of military resources spent on these conflicts has 
produced only very limited results. Future stabilization efforts will instead likely be based 
on a strategy of a small military footprint and local solutions to local problems.3 Special 
operations forces have traditionally been used for these types of missions. With their 
flexible mindset, cultural awareness, and small size, special operations forces can operate 
independently in remote areas to help build up the capacity of local forces. However, 
such efforts require a long-term commitment to be successful and special operations 
forces units are a scarce resource—especially for a small nation like Denmark.  
After being involved in the conflict in Afghanistan since 2002 and in Iraq since 
2003, Denmark has in 2015 and 2007 respectively, withdrawn the bulk of its troops from 
these theaters. However, Denmark’s political commitment to deploy troops to support 
stabilization efforts is not expected to decrease in the near future for either conventional 
forces or special operations forces. Danish special operations forces and conventional 
forces have deployed to Mali and Iraq in 2016, while conventional forces are still in 
                                                 
1 Therése Pettersson and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946–2014,” Journal of Peace 
Research 52, no. 4 (July 1, 2015): 537, doi:10.1177/0022343315595927. 
2 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Cary, 
NC, USA: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), 267–68, http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/
docDetail.action?docID=10288349; Paul Schulte, “What Do We Do If We Are Never Going to Do This 
Again?—Western Counter-Insurgency Choices after Iraq and Afghanistan,” in The New Counter-
Insurgency Era in Critical Perspective, ed. Celeste Ward Gventer, David Martin Jones, and M. L. R. Smith 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 341–42. 
3 Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla, 271, 297. 
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Afghanistan.4 Since “Danish security policy is based on Denmark’s aspiration to play an 
active role in managing global security challenges,”5 such involvement could eventually 
lead to overstretch for special operations forces and the risk of missions being cancelled 
prior to having achieved their objective. Additionally, declining defense budgets, which 
have been the trend for most NATO countries over the last decade, can erode the 
coherence among the ways, ends, and means of stability operations.  
The 2013–2017 Danish Defence Agreement dictated a budget cut of 10–15% 
(DKK 2.7 billion) and a total restructuring of the Danish Defense Forces.6 In contrast to 
the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy, special operations forces were provided with 
more resources via the establishment of a Danish Special Operations Command.7 In a 
military environment in which everyone is fighting for resources, this adds to the pressure 
on special operations forces to deliver results. However, even with the allocation of more 
resources to special operations forces, there is still the challenge that special operations 
forces operators cannot be mass produced given the special selection and training they 
require. Therefore, different solutions to address the political demand for military 
capacity building missions must be explored.  
We hypothesize that stabilization operations will be more effective if 
conventional forces and special operations forces synchronize and integrate their efforts 
to build up local military capacity, and thus enhance sustainability and cohesion in 
Denmark’s future engagements.  
                                                 
4 Throughout 2016, Denmark maintains a small contingent in Afghanistan as part of Operation 
Resolute Support and is currently involved in the fight against Islamic State in Iraq in Operation Inherent 
Resolve. 
5 “Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the 
World,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of Justice, November 
2013, 1, http://www.danida-publikationer.dk/publikationer/publikationsdetaljer.aspx?PId=96a699ab-c874-
4c9c-a22d-a8ea6fc24464. 




B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE  
The purpose of this study is to conceptualize the composition of Danish military 
task forces consisting of special operations forces and conventional forces for 
engagement in military capacity building. Our recommendations are intended for the joint 
Defence Command Denmark, which provides the military guidance to the Danish 
Ministry of Defence.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can Danish conventional forces and special operations forces better integrate 
and synchronize their efforts to conduct regional stabilization operations through local 
military capacity building? 
D. METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH 
By examining the predicted characteristics of possible future conflicts, and 
combining these with current Danish policies, we will describe the likely environment in 
which the Danish Armed Forces will find themselves operating. This capstone will draw 
on historical examples to illustrate the extent to which successful integration and 
synchronization might correlate with: common understanding of doctrine; joint 
organization and the sharing and use of technology; and whether these operations should 
be considered examples of “task assignment” or “full integration.”8 By analyzing 
integration and synchronization as functions of organization, technology, and doctrine, 
the capstone will present possible solutions for better integration and synchronization 
between conventional forces and special operations forces. We base our analysis of 
organization, doctrine, and technology on Danish Lieutenant Colonel K.V. Nielsen’s 
model of “warfighting’s inner circle,”9 in which organization, doctrine, and technology 
are seen as three interdependent variables. If one variable changes the others must change 
as well in order for the organization to function optimally. See Figure 1.10 
                                                 
8 The terms “task assignment” and “full integration” are covered later in this chapter.  
9 Mikkel Storm Jensen, “Krigsførelsens Kredsløb,” Militært Tidsskrift 133, no. 1 (April 2004): 177. 
10 The model was developed in Danish and has been translated to English by the authors. 
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Figure 1.  Warfighting’s Inner Circle11 
E. FULL INTEGRATION AND TASK ASSIGNMENT 
Special operations forces and conventional forces often find themselves working 
alongside each other in ways that demand some form of cooperation or integration. Much 
has been written by military professionals on this topic, highlighting the necessity and 
benefits of increased integration between conventional forces and special operations 
forces.12 At the same time, integration and the combined use of conventional, irregular 
and special operations forces is not a new concept and has been used by battlefield 
commanders many times in history. Examples include Nathanael Greene who, during the 
American Revolutionary Campaign of 1780–1781 in the South, utilized both types of 
forces against the British; T.E. Lawrence in World War 1 between 1916–1918;13 the 
British campaign in Malaya in 1948–1960;14 Vietnam’s Vo Nguyen Giap during the 
                                                 
11 Adapted from Jensen, “Krigsførelsens Kredsløb.”  
12 For a few examples see Joel P. Ellison and Daniel G. Hodermarsky, “Conventional and Special 
Operations Forces Integration at the Operational Level” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2012); Michael Kershaw, “The Integration of Special Operations and General Purpose Forces” (Master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1994); Richard Finfera, “Leveraging Capabilities: The Integration of 
Special Operation Forces and Conventional Forces” (Master’s thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, 
2010). 
13 John Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders and Bandits—How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped 
Our World (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2011), 12. 
14 Robert W. Komer, “The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of A Successful 
Counterinsurgency Effort” (Santa Monica, CA, USA: Rand, February 1972). 
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Vietnam wars in 1945–1975;15 the French effort in Algeria in 1954–1962;16 and the 
British campaign in Northern Ireland in 1967–2007.17 
Generally, integration between conventional and unconventional forces18 occurs 
via task assignment and/or full integration.19 These terms describe the use of 
unconventional forces as either separated or integrated20 in relation to their conventional 
counterparts. Michael Kershaw defines integrated operations in his master’s thesis as 
“those in which SOF [Special Operations Forces] and GPF [General Purpose Forces] are 
employed to accomplish interdependent tasks necessary for the successful completion of 
the overall mission.”21 What is important in relation to integration is the fact that forces 
work to achieve a common objective and to complete the overall mission. In this sense, 
integration encompasses both task assignment and full integration. 
With task assignment, integration between the forces exists in the sense that they 
both work for the successful completion of the overall mission. However, special 
operations forces conduct tasks in isolation, and not in conjunction with conventional 
forces. The French counterinsurgency campaign in Algeria in the years 1954–1962 
represents an example of this type of integration between conventional forces and 
unconventional forces. During this campaign, French regular army units were used as 
“ground holders” in a quadrillage22 system.23 Within the quadrillages the sparsely 
                                                 
15 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders and Bandits, 12. 
16 Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962 (London: Pan Books, 2002). 
17 Richard Iron, “Britain’s Longest War—Northern Ireland 1967–2007,” in Counterinsurgency in 
Modern Warfare (Oxford, United Kingdom: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 167–84.  
18 The term “unconventional forces” is used to describe forces that fall outside of the definition of 
conventional forces. When describing historical examples from Vietnam and the American-Indian war the 
forces integrated with the conventional forces were not special operations forces by the modern-day 
definition, but may well be termed as irregulars or unconventional forces. However, the point remains that 
these forces were not conventional, but integrated and used in conjunction with conventional forces to 
achieve a common objective. Furthermore, we use the term conventional forces as the equivalent to the 
U.S. term “general purpose forces.” 
19 The nomenclature of “task assignment” and “full integration” to describe the types of integration is 
credited to Dr. John Arquilla who mentioned these during a session in his office in May 2016.  
20 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders and Bandits, 12. 
21 Kershaw, “The Integration of Special Operations and General Purpose Forces,” 5. 
22 A system of quadrille lines on a map. 
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populated areas were designated as zones d’interdites (forbidden zones) from which the 
population was evacuated. Subsequently, the army was allowed to fire on any person 
moving in the area, thus denying the Front de Liberation National (F.L.N.)24 any access 
to food and restricting their freedom of movement. Populated and fertile zones were 
classified as zones de pacification (pacification zones) where a large number of 
conscripts and reservists were used to assure the security.25 Finally, zones d’operations 
(operations zones) were established in which the French elite forces (the French Foreign 
Legion and the French paratroopers) would hunt the F.L.N.26 Both the regular French 
forces and the elite forces shared the same overall objective of defeating the F.L.N., but 
were used separately within their own areas in a manner consistent with task assignment. 
Seen from a military perspective, the French forces were very effective in defeating the 
F.L.N. However, disastrous political developments finally led to a defeat for France,27 
and Algeria’s independence in 1962.28  
Full integration implies that both conventional forces and special operations 
forces are fully integrated and work beside each other. An example of this is Nathanael 
Greene fighting the British during the American Revolutionary War in 1775–1782. 
During this campaign, Nathanael Green combined the use of unconventional forces and 
regular forces in a way that kept his opponents constantly guessing about his next 
move.29 Greene would integrate his unconventional forces with his regular Continentals. 
For instance, he would mass his Continentals, and when the British Redcoats attacked, 
Greene’s unconventional units would wreak havoc, forcing the Redcoats to chase them, 
                                                                                                                                                 
23 Hugues Canuel, “French Counterinsurgency in Algeria: Forgotten Lessons From a Misunderstood 
Conflict,” Small Wars Journal, March 14, 2010, 6, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/french-
counterinsurgency-in-algeria. 
24 Front de Liberation National (FLN) was established in October 1954 by Algerian radicalists. The 
organization fought for full Algerian independence from France. (Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 78–79.) 
25 The French commander, General André Beaufre, aimed for a physical presence of one company per 
100 square kilometers. (Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 166.) 
26 Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 165–167. 
27 Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 505–534; Canuel, “French Counterinsurgency in Algeria,” 10. 
28 Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 520–523. 
29 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders and Bandits, 30–40. 
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thereby creating an opening for Greene to exploit.30 In this case, unconventional and 
conventional forces were fully integrated as they both pursued the same overall objective 
and worked alongside and fully integrated with each other. 
Full integration and task assignment can exist simultaneously. For instance, a task 
force can be considered fully integrated if it consists of both conventional forces and 
special operations forces working together toward the same objective. However, when 
there are two separate task forces, one of special operations forces and one of 
conventional forces at the headquarters level, each can be said to be task assigned when 
working toward the same objective, but in a separated manner. See Figure 2 for a 
graphical depiction of full integration and task assignment. 
 
Figure 2.  Graphical Depiction of Full Integration and Task 
Assignment Depending on Organizational Level of 
Analysis 
In Chapter II, we will outline the current trends in Danish policy, the 
characteristics of future conflict scenarios, and the doctrinal framework in order to 
ascertain a range of likely future conflict scenarios that could involve Danish troops. In 
Chapter III, we will describe the roles Danish special operations forces and conventional 
                                                 
30 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders and Bandits, 270. 
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forces have played in joint stabilization operations and describe current relevant 
capacities within the Danish Defence for military capacity building missions. In Chapter 
IV we present two generalizable conflict scenarios and conceptualize their potential 
responses. These scenarios will draw from historical examples. Finally, in Chapter V we 
will re-examine our scenarios through the lens of how Denmark could tailor its responses 





II. BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS 
In this chapter, we will examine situational factors that frame the context in which 
Danish conventional forces and special operations forces are likely to deploy. First, we 
will review Danish foreign policy and defense policy. Second, we will outline the main 
characteristics of the environment in which Danish stabilization operations and capacity 
building are likely to be executed. Finally, we will define the doctrinal frame and 
terminology according to which stabilization operations and capacity building are 
currently carried out. 
A. DANISH FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES 
Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, Denmark has conducted an active foreign 
and security policy in the international arena. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
and the introduction of democracy in the eastern part of Europe, any direct threat to 
Danish territory seemed to vanish. Denmark could now shift its foreign and security 
policy focus to more distant and indirect threats. 
Denmark’s military involvement in international missions over the last 25 years 
has been comprehensive—especially given its relatively small size. The most extensive 
involvements have been during the conflicts in the Balkans since 1992, in Afghanistan 
since 2002 and in Iraq from 2003–2007. These were all conflicts in which the Danish 
Army committed the bulk of the personnel. However, both the Danish Navy, the Danish 
Air Force, and special operations forces have also contributed and continue to do so. 
There is no indication that Danish international involvement is likely to decline in 
the near future. On the contrary, an increasing number of diverse threats to Danish 
interests seems to point in the opposite direction. Conflicts in the Middle East and North 
Africa have led to refugee streams which could further destabilize those regions and 
result in the growth of violent extremist organizations. Indirectly, conflicts in the Middle 
East and Africa affect European security and cohesion. On the Eastern borders of Europe, 
the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and Russia’s growing hostility toward 
its neighbors, as well as the EU and the United States, have resulted in rising tensions and 
 10
a situation which to some degree resembles that of the Cold War. Although neither 
situation presents a direct threat to Danish territory or sovereignty, events in the Middle 
East and Africa and the aggressive signals from Russia will continue to impact 
Denmark’s future foreign and security policy.  
In 2015, the Danish government appointed a commission to carry out a review of 
areas of interest for Denmark’s foreign and security policy, defense policy, trade policy, 
and development policy. The findings were published in a report in May 2016. The report 
concluded that for Denmark to protect and enhance Danish interests in the future, 
Denmark must continue to contribute actively within the multilateral frameworks of the 
EU, the UN, and NATO.31 The Russian threat can best be countered through continued 
economic sanctions via the EU and by a NATO-led military presence in neighboring 
countries, while still maintaining a diplomatic dialogue with Moscow.32 In contrast, the 
situations in the Middle East and Africa require a comprehensive approach and a long-
term plan to achieve enduring stability.33 
Stabilization efforts in fragile states are important for those states’ development 
and security. “Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-
Affected Areas of the World”34 is a document written in cooperation between the Danish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of Justice. The document 
describes the Danish strategy and approach to conducting stabilization. An integrated 
approach is defined as:  
an approach where all authorities or parts of an organization (e.g., the UN) 
involved in a given stabilization effort work together towards a commonly 
defined stabilization goal. This encompasses collaboration on planning, 
implementation, and lesson learning regarding political, development, and 
security-related efforts. An integrated stabilization effort may take place 
                                                 
31 Peter Taksøe-Jensen, “Danish Diplomacy and Defence in Times of Change—The Way Ahead for 
Denmark’s Interests and Values towards 2030,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2016, 25–31, 
http://um.dk/da/Udenrigspolitik/aktuelle-emner/dansk-diplomati-og-forsvar-i-en-brydningstid/. 
32 Ibid., 33–35. 
33 Ibid., 37–38. 
34 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of Justice, “Denmark’s 
Integrated Stabilisation Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the World.” 
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before, during, and after a conflict. Integrated stabilization efforts may 
well be applied without any military element. The military tool is only one 
of many that may be used in a given situation.35 
Although stabilization efforts can take place without the use of the military, the 
fragile security situations found in many countries in the Middle East and Africa will 
likely require the use of the military to provide the basic physical security necessary to 
create the preconditions for other agencies to conduct their work. Military capacity 
building through advising, mentoring, partnering, assisting, and training36 of local 
security forces, and the building of security institutions, are vital elements in securing 
long-term and sustainable stability. “Preventive security is the path to lasting stability”37
and reduces the “humanitarian and economic costs of a potential conflict.”38 
However, as a small country with limited resources, Denmark must prioritize and 
select a few countries in which it can make a difference. The focus for the past 15 years 
has mostly been on Afghanistan and Iraq, but regions in Africa have also received some 
attention, and regional programs funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Ministry of Defence through the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund have been 
established for the Horn of Africa and the Sahel.39 The Danish focus on the Horn of 
Africa has predominantly been to counter piracy. As piracy diminishes around the Horn 
of Africa, but increases in the Gulf of Guinea, Denmark will likely move its effort toward 
Nigeria, where Denmark has large commercial and maritime interests.40 Denmark already 
has forces deployed to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and this region will 
continue to remain a threat to Europe and Denmark. Additionally, the spread of the 
Islamic State’s influence to Libya, combined with Libya’s geographic location as a 
35 Ibid.,11. 
36 The terms advise, mentor, partner, and assist are defined with some variety depending on which 
doctrinal framework is used as reference. The definitions of the four terms, as used in this capstone, are 
defined in Appendix A. 
37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of Justice, “Denmark’s 
Integrated Stabilisation Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the World,” 12. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 23. 
40 Taksøe-Jensen, “Danish Diplomacy and Defence in Times of Change—The Way Ahead for 
Denmark’s Interests and Values towards 2030,” 39. 
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migration corridor to Europe, makes Libya a strategic center of gravity in North Africa 
that requires increased attention.41 
The most significant challenge the Danish Armed Forces face is likely to be the 
lack of resources to conduct and sustain an overly ambitious international program. 
Danish defense expenditures have gone from 2.4% of GDP during the years 1970–198442 
to 1.2% of GDP in 201543—far from the 2% mark pledged by all NATO countries to be 
the minimum goal by 2024.44 The 2013–2017 Defence Agreement resulted in a budget 
cut of 10–15% of Denmark’s overall defense budget.45 The aim was to achieve cost 
savings through streamlining and by improving efficiencies in the support structure. 
Furthermore, Denmark has undertaken a massive investment in new combat aircraft and 
these are to be financed within the existing defense budget.  
Ironically, this resource scarcity may indirectly contribute to more capacity 
building efforts in the future. Military capacity building can be undertaken by single 
individuals as well as by task forces comprised of different units, which is much less 
costly than deploying large combat formations that require a large operational and 
logistical support structure, as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, although capacity 
building abroad costs less and requires fewer personnel than do large-scale interventions, 
successful capacity building takes time and requires a long-term plan and commitment. 
Efforts can take many years and, in the case of military capacity building as part of 
preventive stabilization, measuring the exact impact can be difficult since the military 
effort is just one of many initiatives. Still, the future of Danish foreign and security policy 
                                                 
41 Taksøe-Jensen, “Danish Diplomacy and Defence in Times of Change—The Way Ahead for 
Denmark’s Interests and Values towards 2030,” 37–38. 
42 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Press Service, “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO 
Defence,” Press Release (Brussels: NATO, November 28, 1989), 4, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/
assets/pdf/pdf_1989_11/20100830_1989-043.pdf.  
43 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2008-2015),” 
Press Release, (January 28, 2016), 6, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_01/
20160129_160128-pr-2016-11-eng.pdf—page=6. 
44 “Wales Summit Declaration,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, September 5, 2014, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm. 
45 “Danish Defence Agreement 2013–2017,” Forsvarsministeren.  
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points toward military capacity building as a key component of integrated stabilization 
efforts. 
B. GENERAL TRENDS OF FUTURE CONFLICT SCENARIOS 
Conflicts in the beginning of the twenty-first century seem to involve more non-
state actors than historically has been the case. Since the end of the Cold War, countless 
non-state actors have emerged, particularly in Third World countries. This has added 
complexity to what is also an increasing number of intrastate wars. Classical state-on-
state conflicts, with a defined beginning and end, have decreased in number.46  
Uncontrolled territory in Africa and the Middle East has the potential to become 
the breeding ground for terrorist organizations. It is therefore important to examine some 
of the general trends in contemporary warfare that relate to Africa in particular, to define 
conventional forces’ and special operations forces’ roles in stabilization operations 
designed to assist sovereign African states to manage domestic and regional threats. 
Experts have debated whether contemporary wars are conceptually “new,” or 
whether they just resemble conflicts prior to the Westphalia Peace Agreement in 1648. 
Since the seventeenth century, most wars in Europe have been interstate conflicts, and 
thus helped shape doctrine, organization, and technology within Western militaries. As 
has been said by Charles Tilly: War makes states, and states make war, and the making of 
states was a rational process whereby kings offered protection in exchange for funds (i.e., 
taxes). To be considered sovereign, a state should have: clearly defined borders typically 
guaranteed by a military force; a central government with a monopoly on violence; and a 
social contract between government and population in order to finance peoples’ 
protection and the security of the state.47 If a state fails to meet these characteristics, it 
can be considered weak or failed, thus giving other states and non-state power brokers the 
opportunity to fill the power vacuum. National sovereignty is undermined by 
                                                 
46 Therése Pettersson and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946–2014,” Journal of Peace 
Research, 2015, 537, http://jpr.sagepub.com.libproxy.nps.edu/content/52/4/536.full.pdf+html. 
47 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in From Bringing the State 
Back in, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985), 170–191. 
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organizations that refuse to recognize sovereign states’ monopoly on violence. In some 
places, national borders may be obliterated, which only increases mobility for non-state 
actors.48 In order to help stabilize a country, it is imperative to support state institutions 
as well as units that can counter non-state actors, whether these are insurgent groups, 
criminal gangs, or foreign state/non-state companies. 
Interstate conflicts in Africa are rare, and the region is more prone to intrastate 
conflicts because of high levels of poverty, low economic growth, poor state capacity, 
and dependence on natural resources. Moreover, many African countries are 
characterized by high degrees of ethnic diversity that make it difficult to form a national 
identity. The terrain is rugged, and there has been poor development of infrastructure, 
which makes it costly for governments to project power. The states in Europe were 
shaped by the wars they fought, and the borders generally match the underlying 
demographics.49 Many African states’ borders are an artifact of the colonial past and 
were agreed upon during the Berlin Conference in 1884–85. Thus, many African 
countries only have juridical statehood rather than empirical statehood; this reflects the 
opposite of what is found in European states.50 However, to re-draw the borders in Africa 
along ethnic lines is impractical, and therefore it is important, as never before, to 
strengthen state institutions in order for African governments to be able to manage their 
own problems. In the long run, states will only be able to enforce their social contracts 
with their populations if the countries are stabilized sufficiently to achieve a tolerable 
threshold of security and a commitment to good governance. 
Many wars in Africa are identity-based wars that rally people for or against a 
cause. The wars have to be understood in the context of globalization that intensifies 
global political, cultural, economic, and military interconnectedness, and increases the 
                                                 
48 Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, n.d.), 224–227. 
49 Anke Hoeffler, “The Economics of Violent Conflict and War in Africa,” The Oxford Handbook of 
Africa and Economics: Context and Concepts, January 2014, 16–17. 
50 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Emperical and 
Juridical in Statehood,” World Politics, 1982, 21–24. An empirical statehood requires a stable community, 
permanent population, and effective governmental monopoly of violence that can exercise control. Juridical 
statehood is only a normative international tribute that does not automatically entail internal cohesion in a 
country. 
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maneuverability of non-state actors. Often, it is hard to distinguish combatants from non-
combatants, resulting in large-scale violations of human rights. The speed of political 
mobilization is significantly increased by modern electronic media.51 Media, especially 
the Internet and television, are widely used to disseminate propaganda, thus creating an 
asymmetry of war.52 The principle of electronic levee en masse points to the fact that 
digital connectivity has increased the speed of mass mobilization and coordination to a 
degree that has proved difficult for totalitarian states to counter. Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Libya during the Arab Spring exemplify this.53 Because stabilization has to be 
sustainable, efforts are not only a matter of physically producing units to support a ruling 
government, but also require a genuine mutual relationship between government and 
population. 
C. DANISH COUNTERINSURGENCY AND STABILIZATION DOCTRINE 
IN GENERAL 
From the Danish political perspective, stabilization engagements in fragile and 
conflict-affected areas of the world require an emphasis on an integrated interagency 
approach to develop security and development. A stabilization strategy demands a 
combination of diplomacy, military engagement, and development assistance, thus 
making the military only one of the means to be used.54  
The Danish Army Field Manual55 constitutes the overarching national doctrine for 
Danish land warfare operations at the formation level and intersects with NATO’s 
doctrine (found in AJP-3.2 and ATP-3.2.1.). The Army Field Manual is the cornerstone 
for other Danish Army field manuals, and serves as a tool to provide a uniform 
understanding about how assets should be utilized in a coordinated framework in order to 
                                                 
51 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars, Third Edition (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012), 4–8. 
52 Herfried Münkler, The New Wars, vol. 2002 (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2002), 
12–28. 
53 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of Urban Guerilla Warfare, vol. 2013 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 206. 
54 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement in Fragile and 
Conflict-Affected Areas of the World,” 1. 
55 The Danish Army Field Manual that covers formation level is called Feltreglement I in Danish. 
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achieve the best possible effect and success in the assigned area of operation.56 Although 
the Danish Army Field Manual is the guiding manual for Danish conventional forces in 
stabilization operations, it is not widely utilized by the Navy, the Air Force, or special 
operations forces. The Danish Navy, Air Force, and special operations forces 
predominantly use NATO doctrine instead. Yet, even with NATO doctrine as a common 
reference at the joint level, the services take different approaches when it comes to 
stabilization operations. 
According to Danish and NATO doctrine, we can define four campaign themes at 
the operational level: major combat operations (MC), security operations (SECURITY), 
peace support operations (PSO), and peace military engagement operations (PME).57 The 
purpose of a campaign theme is to “describe the broad general conditions that exist in an 
area of operations and provide principles to guide planning and action as a campaign 
progresses…[thus]… operational objectives are realised [sic] through the assignment and 
execution of tactical activities.”58 Campaign themes reflect an attempt to structure 
warfare into tangible concepts and to coordinate tactical activities in order to create the 
desired effects. For instance, security operations were previously called 
counterinsurgency (COIN) and now encompass an interaction between various tactical 
activities and operations that enable a society to be stabilized.59 Thus, stabilization 
becomes a military activity that can be included in all campaign themes, but places its 
emphasis on the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, compared to offensive or 
defensive major combat operations. See Figure 3.  
                                                 
56 Danish Army Staff, “Feltreglement I (HRN 010–001)” (Danish Army Staff, September 2014), 1. 
57 Danish Army Staff, “Feltreglement I (HRN 010–001),” 104–7. 
58 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allied Land Tactics (ATP-3.2.1)” (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization Allied Publication, November 2009), 1–5. 
59 Danish Army Staff, “Feltreglement I (HRN 010–001),” 105. 
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Figure 3.  Campaign Themes60 
The purpose of stabilization activities is to address underlying tensions and reduce 
the level of violence, and thereby establish conditions that create the foundation for 
civilian reconstruction and development toward a defined end-state.61 Stability activities 
“impose security and control over an area while employing military capabilities to restore 
services and support civilian agencies.”62 The definition of stability operations clearly 
underlines the military’s role as one among a variety of tools to stabilize a country or a 
region. The military is not designed to conduct state building, but it is a vital component 
in a multidimensional comprehensive approach to strengthen the capacity of a state’s 
security forces and institutions. The military is also essential in helping the local forces to 
provide a minimum of security until the host nation can take over by itself. 
Danish conventional forces are typically assigned to execute offensive activities, 
defensive activities, stabilization activities, and/or enabling activities,63 whereas the 
Danish special operations forces execute either direct action, special reconnaissance, or 
military assistance.64 Military assistance “is a broad category of measures and activities 
that support and influence critical friendly assets through organizing training, advising, 
mentoring, or the conduct of combined operations… [and] includes, but is not limited to, 
capability building of friendly security forces, engagement with local, regional, and 
national leadership or organizations, and civic actions supporting and influencing the 
                                                 
60 Danish Army Staff, “Feltreglement I (HRN 010–001),” 106. 
61 Danish Army Staff, “Feltreglement I (HRN 010–001),” 901. 
62 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allied Land Tactics (ATP-3.2.1),” 1–6. 
63 Danish Army Staff, “Feltreglement I (HRN 010–001),” 108–10. 
64 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5),” 2–1. 
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local population.”65 Conventional forces’ stability activities and special operations 
forces’ military assistance are traditionally the predominant activities in a security or a 
peace support operations campaign.  
The development of the information environment, which has intensified since the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, has increased the focus on information operations66 
that strive to have the desired effect on an adversary’s will, understanding, and capacity, 
using kinetic and non-kinetic effects.67 The aim is to “reinforce or affect changes in 
behavior, influence the will, shape perceptions, improve or degrade capabilities, and 
affect information systems”68 of the adversary/population. An essential feature of 
information operations is to coordinate functions in order to support overarching efforts. 
It is important to incorporate the significance of information operations into the training 
of local forces, where the usage of the media and forming perceptions undoubtedly play a 
key role. Training local forces is not only a matter of training them to conduct kinetic 
operations, but perhaps even more importantly in population-centric warfare, to train 
them to conduct non-kinetic operations in order to win on the cognitive battlefield. 
NATO has introduced the concept of “shape-secure-develop” which is a 
population-centric approach. This differs from the “clear-hold-build” strategy69 which 
focuses on gaining and holding terrain. Between 2006 and 2014, Danish forces 
predominantly used the “clear-hold-build” strategy in Helmand Province in Afghanistan. 
This approach applied what was also known as “the ink spot principle.” However, “clear-
hold-build” was hard to execute in practice because it required physical expansion. Yet, 
Denmark as a member of NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), did not 
                                                 
65 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5),” 2–1. 
66 Information Operations includes: Key Leader Engagement; Presence, Posture, Profile; 
Psychological Operations; Civilian and Military Cooperation; Deception operations; Electronic Warfare; 
Computer Network Operations; Operational Security and Information Security; and Physical Destruction. 
FR I, p. 213–214. 
67 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (AJP-3.10)” 
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization Allied Publication, November 2009), 1–1-1–2. 
68 Danish Division, “Danish Division Information Operations Handbook” (Danish Division, October 
2013), 5. 
69 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Guidance for the Application of Tactical Military Activities in 
Counterinsurgency (Study Draft 3 ATP-3.4.4.1),” 3–1—3–10. 
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have enough resources to cover every inch of the ground. Another flaw was the initial 
Western assumption that we could win the hearts and minds of the local population. 
Looking to the future, nothing suggests that Denmark will have the resources to be able 
to seize and control built-up areas or deeply remote mountains, jungles, or deserts. Also, 
as has been noted, the ability of outsiders to understand local actors and adversaries is 
often lacking.70  
Judging by recent engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, it seems that foreign 
forces on their own can have difficulty defeating insurgents. Thus, the best way to 
stabilize a country or region “is to create conditions that will enable local forces to win it 
for them.”71 This does not mean that the concept of “shape-secure-develop” will not 
succeed since it may, in fact, work if local forces execute the concept in their own 
country. However, for it to do so under any circumstances “requires the integration of all 
elements of national power - diplomacy, information operations, intelligence, financial, 
and military – to achieve the predominantly political objectives of establishing a stable 
national power government that can secure itself against internal and external threats.”72  
Finally, while capacity building must be a central pillar for a new or fragile state, 
one pitfall when it comes to re-building is to only train the “shooters.” It is equally 
important to train and educate those responsible for all other aspects of “shape-secure-
develop,” as well. 
In sum, the “shape-secure-develop” strategy can serve as a framework for 
stabilization in which military units contribute by providing security and help to build 
military capabilities. The military plays a vital role when it comes to stabilizing a 
country, but its roles within all three circles in Figure 4 have to be clear. 
                                                 
70 David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell, Counterinsurgency In Crisis. Britain and the Challenges of 
Modern Warfare. (New York: Columbia University Press, n.d.), 145. 
71 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (United States of America: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005), xiv. 
72 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 2005, xvi. 
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The bold text highlights tasks to be undertaken by military units. This, however, does not 
rule out that military units could engage in other activities. 
Figure 4.  Illustrative Tasks in the “Shape-Secure-Develop” 
Framework.73 
D. CONCLUSION 
Denmark’s foreign and security policy has led to increased deployments of the 
military since the end of the Cold War, and nothing points to this changing in the near 
future. However, the focus will likely shift toward capacity building of local security 
forces and institutions in support of local solutions to local problems. Seizing key terrain 
and destroying the adversary’s forces will not be sufficient in future conflicts. To 
stabilize situations also requires adopting a people-centric approach and a focus on 
winning the cognitive fight. Stabilization demands a comprehensive full-spectrum kinetic 
and non-kinetic approach, in which the “shape-secure-develop” strategy guides 
conventional forces’ and special operations forces’ approaches. It is likely, too, that 
conventional forces and special operations forces will need to target multiple geographic 
places simultaneously, and efforts will need to be sustainable over a prolonged period of 
time, because capacity building of units and state institutions are long-term projects.  
                                                 
73 Adapted from North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Guidance for the Application of Tactical 
Military Activities in Counterinsurgency (Study Draft 3 ATP-3.4.4.1),” 3–2. 
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The military is just one of the tools to be applied. It is not the multi-tool that can 
do it all. However, the military can provide sufficient security so that other institutions 
and organizations can fulfill their roles in stabilization, thereby helping to resolve 
conflicts that not only threaten specific countries in Africa, but that also may pose a threat 
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III. DANISH ARMED FORCES’ ROLE IN STABILIZATION 
OPERATIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline what roles Danish special operations 
forces and conventional forces can play in joint stabilization operations. First, the 
development of Danish special operations forces and conventional forces from 1991–
2016 is described. This development has created an overlap in tasks that can be valuable 
for military capacity building missions. Second, we describe how relevant capabilities 
that already exist within the Danish Defence can be further developed.  
A. CAPACITIES OF THE DANISH DEFENCE 
The Danish Ministry of Defence is the highest command authority in the Danish 
military. The Ministry of Defence consists of a ministerial department and a number of 
agencies. Other services may contribute in a whole of government approach, but relevant 
to this study is the Defence Command Denmark and the Home Guard Command that 
both oversee military units. The Defence Command Denmark has the Army Staff, the 
Naval Staff, the Air Staff, and the Special Operations Command under the command of 
the Chief of Defence at its disposal. The Home Guard Command refers directly to the 
Ministry of Defence74 (see Appendix C and D). 
1. The Royal Danish Army 
The Army has to be able to deploy a robust battle group at any time for 
international missions and to handle national tasks. As an alternative to the deployment of 
a robust battle group, the Army has to be able to deploy a joint task force to support 
humanitarian operations or special operations forces.75 The Army has a long tradition of 
deploying units for peacekeeping and peace enforcing missions, though since September 
11, 2001, the Army has been continuously involved in missions ranging from stability 
                                                 
74 “Danish Ministry of Defence,” Danish Ministry of Defence, n.d., http://www.fmn.dk/eng/Aboutus/
agencies/Pages/danish-mod-agencies.aspx 
75 “Hæren,” Defence Command Denmark, n.d., http://www2.forsvaret.dk/omos/organisation/haeren/
Pages/IA_forside.aspx. 
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activities to offensive kinetic activities predominantly, in Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, 
the Army’s main experiences come from recent stability operations in the Balkans (1993-
present), Iraq (2003-2007), and Afghanistan (2002-2015) and capacity building in 
Afghanistan (2012-2014) and Iraq (2014-2016). 
The Army consists of the Army Staff, the Danish Division, 1st and 2nd Brigade, 
and a number of regiments and centers of excellence76 (see Appendix E). The Army is 
comprised of personnel with three different levels of training: conscripts (0-4 months), 
personnel on a reaction force contract (5-12 months), and professional enlisted personnel 
(>12 months). The Army’s fundamental operational unit is the battle group, which is 
designed to carry out full spectrum operations ranging from major combat operations to 
peacetime military engagement operations in respect to the full spectrum of threats.  
The battle group is a flexible task organization that can be changed depending on 
the assigned task. For instance, 1st and 2nd Brigade command the maneuver and 
reconnaissance units, and the regiments and centers of excellence train and support the 
units that plug into the battle groups. The Division and the two brigades are responsible 
for training the battle groups across the full spectrum of operations. The formations have 
staffs that are capable of developing and executing operational plans across the spectrum 
of conflict.  
In stability operations, the battle group will typically include infantry; fire 
support; intelligence, surveillance, targeting, acquisition, and reconnaissance support; 
engineers (including explosive ordnance disposal units); logistic support; and civil-
military cooperation units (CIMIC77).78 Officers trained in information operations and 
psychological operations are embedded in the battle group staff to support a non-kinetic 
                                                 
76 “Hæren.” 
77 CIMIC establishes, coordinates, and provides liaison between military units and local actors such as 
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78 Adjutant of the Danish Chief of Defence, “Standardbriefing Tilrettet Forsvaret,” (Copenhagen July 
15, 2015). This briefing is a standard briefing on Defence Command Denmark and its organization. It was 
made for the Danish Chief of Defence. It has been provided to the authors by the adjutant of the Danish 
Chief of Defence. 
 25
approach. The Army does not have dedicated units for capacity building, but can instead 
utilize units consisting of professional enlisted personnel to carry out capacity building 
missions. However, if the Army has to deploy its battle groups continuously in a 
conventional fashion, it is less likely that it can support capacity building missions. 
The Army’s doctrine is a conventional doctrine that takes a maneuverist approach 
in order to undermine an adversary’s will and ability to fight in the physical and cognitive 
domains through kinetic and non-kinetic activities and effects.79 In terms of stabilization 
operations within the framework of security operations (counterinsurgency) campaigns, 
the Army utilizes the Danish Army Field Manual, NATO doctrine, and recent British and 
Danish experiences from engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2003 and 2014. 
The “clear-hold-build” strategy has been pivotal for army units operating in Afghanistan, 
and many staff officers who worked in the higher staff echelons in ISAF are familiar with 
the “shape-secure-develop” strategy. As a result, many Danish Army officers and non-
commissioned officers have practical experience in planning and delivering capacity 
building assistance to local forces.  
The Army’s recent technological development has enhanced its command and 
control. Large quantities of high-tech materiel, weapons, and night-fighting equipment 
have been procured, and the Army is currently implementing a digital tactical 
communication system (HTK)80 thus digitalizing the battle groups all the way down to 
the squad level. HTK enhances the exchange of information prior, during, and after 
operations and is currently being integrated with the Air Force for the purposes of 
conducting digital close air support. Recently, the Army has procured the Piranha 5 as the 
main armored personnel carrier, which offers enhanced protection against mines and 
improvised explosive devices. The Army is continuously looking for technological 
solutions that that will enable it to deploy units with a small logistical footprint. 
                                                 
79 Danish Army Staff, “Feltreglement I (HRN 010–001),” 113. Feltreglement is abbreviated to FR I in 
Danish. 
80 HTK is an abbreviation for “Hærens Taktiske Kommunikationssystem.” HTK is a digital system to 
track units and individuals and push/pull digital information on the battlefield. 
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The Army has experience from Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of stability 
operations and capacity building embedded in the ranks. Senior non-commissioned 
officers and officers, mostly at the rank of captain and higher, have a good doctrinal and 
practical understanding of working together with indigenous forces in terms of training, 
mentoring, and advising. Available technology, (i.e., weapons systems, armor, 
surveillance, and communications) is of a high enough quality that Danish battle groups 
can work closely together with other services and allied partners or be autonomously 
deployed in remote areas of operation.  
The Army’s battle group structure is conceptually flexible, and the enlisted 
professional soldiers are in general mature enough to interact closely with local forces. 
However, the Army has so few units that it is challenged to provide sufficient personnel 
for expeditionary deployments. Moreover, the training cycle and production of units 
makes it very difficult for the Army to assign units to other services, to include, special 
operations forces. Doing so also shatters the internal cohesion of its core units. 
2. The Royal Danish Navy 
The Danish Navy’s core tasks encompass both national tasks and international 
operations. National tasks include the assertion of Danish sovereignty, search and rescue 
missions at sea, surveillance and control of pollution, fishery inspections, and assistance 
to the police and the Ministry of Taxation. Internationally, the Navy mainly contributes 
vessels to coalition efforts such as those undertaken by NATO.81 Since 2008, Danish 
navy vessels have been deployed to the Indian Ocean as part of the multinational 
Combined Task Force 150 and Combined Task Force 151 under the framework of 
Operation Enduring Freedom and as part of NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield. The aim 
has been to counter piracy around the Horn of Africa.82  
                                                 
81 “Søværnet—Den Maritime Del Af Det Danske Forsvar,” Defence Command Denmark, n.d., 
http://www2.forsvaret.dk/omos/organisation/sovarnet/Pages/forside.aspx. 
82 “Pirateribekæmpelse i Adenbugten,” Defence Command Denmark, n.d., http://www2.forsvaret.dk/
viden-om/udland/adenbugten/Pages/Adenbugten3.aspx. 
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The Danish Navy includes the Naval Staff, a deployable command staff, two 
naval squadrons (1st and 2nd), and a navy surveillance center. 1st Squadron’s primary 
focus is national operations in Danish waters, whereas 2nd Squadron is dedicated to 
international operations and combat operations. Even though 2nd Squadron is the primary 
contributor to international operations, vessels from 1st Squadron may be deployed in 
international operations if necessary83 (see Appendix F).  
The Navy’s doctrine is a conventional doctrine that draws heavily on NATO 
doctrine. Even though the Danish Navy dates to 1510 and has been involved in many 
battles in Danish and international waters over the course of its history, it does not have a 
long tradition in counter-insurgency operations, stability operations, or capacity building. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that Navy doctrine emphasizes kinetic actions, blockades, 
and surveillance at sea. However, recent naval capacity building missions in East Africa 
have provided new experiences. The Navy has supported and trained coast guards in the 
Gulf of Aden and Kenya. Furthermore, the Navy has supported the buildup of East 
African Standby Forces that are supposed to deploy and stabilize a local conflict with 
only two weeks’ notice.84  
From a technological standpoint, the Navy frigates (launched in 2011) and 
command and support ships (launched in 2004) are very sophisticated vessels. The 
frigates, command and support ships, and multi-role frigates can all support stabilization 
operations. The frigates (Iver Huitfeldt class) are excellent for conducting escort duty, air 
defense tasks, and fire support for land operations. The command and support ships 
(Absalon class) can perform roles spanning from major combat operations at sea to 
humanitarian operations. Thus, it should be possible to use the command and support 
ship as a flagship, a command headquarters for land operations and/or special operations, 
and as transportation for conventional forces and special operations forces. The multi-role 
frigates are mainly used for inspection and surveillance of Danish waters, but they could 
be used for the same purpose as the frigates, although they are not as technologically 
                                                 
83 “Søværnet—Den Maritime Del Af Det Danske Forsvar.” 
84 “Kapacitetsopbygning i Østafrika,” Defence Command Denmark, n.d., http://www2.forsvaret.dk/
viden-om/udland/fn/dkfnmissioner/afrika/Pages/Kapacitetsopbygningioestafrika.aspx. 
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advanced. All three types of vessel have helicopter landing pads that allow them to carry 
one helicopter. Between 2016 and 2018, the MH-60 Seahawk will gradually be phased in 
as the primary helicopter. The MH-60 has better communications systems and 
observation assets and sensors than does its predecessor, the Super Lynx Mk 90B.85  
The Danish Navy has not been directly engaged in stabilization operations on 
land, and thus its personnel do not have much experience in countering insurgencies. 
However, Danish vessels have continuously been deployed in counter-piracy operations 
since 2008,86 and have low intensity conflict experience in East Africa’s littoral regions, 
as well as having assisted with capacity building of coast guards. The Navy would be a 
strong player in conjunction with other conventional forces and special operations forces 
when it comes to tactical activities, along littoral regions across a range of activities from 
the building of coast guards to surveillance and blockades, to supporting ground 
operations. 
3. The Royal Danish Air Force 
The Danish Air Force’s tasks include surveillance, assertion of Danish 
sovereignty, search and rescue missions, and surveillance and control of pollution. In 
international operations, the Air Force is capable of deploying radars, helicopters, 
transport aircraft, and multi-role fighter aircraft, to execute combat operations, transport 
operations, and surveillance operations.87 Danish F-16s have been deployed in several air 
interdiction missions since NATO’s air campaign over Kosovo in 1999. Today, these 
include missions over Libya, Iraq, and Syria. Since 2005, helicopters and transport 
aircraft have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in various roles supporting ground 
operations.  
The Air Force’s organization is comprised of the Air Staff, three air wings, the 
Air Control Wing with command and control facilities and radars, the Air Force Training 
                                                 
85 “Velkommen Til Første Seahawk,” Defence Command Denmark, June 6, 2016, 
http://www2.forsvaret.dk/nyheder/overige_nyheder/Pages/VelkommentilførsteSeahawk1.aspx. 
86 “Pirateribekæmpelse i Adenbugten.” 
87 “Flyvevåbnet,” Defence Command Denmark,” n.d., http://www2.forsvaret.dk/omos/organisation/
flyvevaabnet/Pages/IA_forside.aspx. 
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Center and the Air Force Tactical Staff (see Appendix G). The Fighter Wing consists of 
two squadrons equipped with F-16 Fighting Falcons. They are mostly used to assert the 
sovereignty of Danish air space, and to perform kinetic actions and air policing in 
international missions. The Air Transport Wing consists of C-130J Hercules transport 
aircraft for transport missions and Challenger CL-604 utility aircraft which have both 
been deployed extensively in support of international operations. The Danish Hercules 
crews are trained to assist Danish special operations forces with various insertion 
methods and supply drops. Embedded in the Air Transport Wing is an operations support 
squadron that can reconnoiter and establish tactical landing zones and Air Land Arming 
and Refueling Points.88 In 2013, Danish Hercules supported French forces in Mali during 
Operation Serval.89 The Helicopter Wing consists of EH-101 Merlin Search & Rescue 
helicopters/Tactical Troop Transport helicopters, Lynx Naval Helicopters (currently 
being replaced by the MH-60R Seahawk), and Fennec Light Observation Helicopters AS-
550 C2. The Air Control Wing includes stationary and transportable long 
range surveillance radars and command and control facilities.90  
The Air Force does not have any national service doctrine. Instead, the Air Force 
uses NATO’s Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations (AJP-3.3) as its 
capstone doctrine. Standard operations procedure manuals define TTPs at the tactical 
level for the air wings. But essentially, the Air Force has no doctrine for stabilization 
operations or capacity building; nor does it have much experience except for individuals 
who have been deployed with the Army on such missions. 
The technological sophistication of the Danish Air Force is high. However, the 
Danish F-16’s are old and will gradually be replaced by the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
starting in 2021.91 The Link-16 and downlinks are generally interoperable with the 
Army’s HTK and Danish special operation forces’ systems. The helicopters, in particular 
                                                 
88 “Flyvevåbnet.” 
89 Forsvarschefen Besøger Operation Serval,” Defence Command Denmark, “ n.d., 
http://www2.forsvaret.dk/nyheder/intops/Pages/ForsvarschefenbesøgerOperationServal.aspx. 
90 “Flyvevåbnet.” 
91 “Aftale om Anskaffelse af Nye Kampfly,” Danish Ministry of Defence, June 9, 2016, 1, 
http://www.fmn.dk/nyheder/Documents/aftale-vedr-kampflyanskaffelse-2016.pdf 
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the EH-101 Merlin and the MH-60R Seahawk, are new and very technologically 
advanced helicopters that are able to deploy under hot/dry and hot/wet conditions in 
Africa. However, none of Denmark’s helicopters have any offensive weapons systems 
that would allow them to carry out strike missions. Thus, helicopters are best utilized for 
observation, insertion of infantry and special operations forces, and medical evacuation.  
The Air Force has recently gained deployment experience using its air platforms 
for various purposes, such as air interdiction in Libya, Iraq, and Syria; surveillance tasks 
in Iraq and around the Horn of Africa; and transport tasks in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Mali. 
The Air Force’s primary strength lies in having platforms that can support both 
conventional and special operations units. The operations support squadron makes it 
possible to insert teams that can reconnoiter air landing strips and support special 
operations forces or conventional forces in remote areas. The Air Force has some 
experience in ground stabilization activities. The Air Force has sent dog teams and 
individuals to various staffs and to serve in Air Force-led, but joint, operational 
mentoring liaison teams in Afghanistan in 2009–2012.92 To develop the Air Force’s 
ability to assist with capacity building within the framework of stabilization operations, 
special units would have to be developed and designated that could partner, assist, advise, 
mentor, and train local forces in specific air-to-ground or air-to-air operations. 
4. The Danish Home Guard 
The Danish Home Guard is made up of volunteers who are recruited from all 
walks of life. The Home Guard plays an active role in Denmark’s “Total Defence 
Concept,” which includes support to the police and the Emergency Management Agency 
in case of major accidents, extraordinary occurrences, major disasters, and protection of 
crucial installations. Since 2006, the Home Guard has deployed small teams, platoons, 
and individuals to different countries, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Georgia. 
The Danish Home Guard can be used in international operations, military capacity 
                                                 
92 “ISAF—Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT),” Combat Support Wing, accessed 
October 12, 2016, http://www2.forsvaret.dk/nyheder/Documents/OMLT.pdf. 
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building, military support to civilian reconstruction, and humanitarian disaster relief, 
primarily under the purview of the Danish Defence.93 
The Danish Home Guard consists of the Army Home Guard, the Naval Home 
Guard, the Air Force Home Guard, the Centre for Stabilisation Engagement, and the 
Special Support and Reconnaissance Company (see Appendix H). Members of the Army 
Home Guard receive the same basic training as do army recruits, which enables them to 
guard fixed installations. The Army Home Guard frequently provides instructors to the 
Army to train army personnel. The Naval Home Guard’s niche is rescue missions, 
surveillance at sea, and securing naval installations. The Air Force Home Guard is 
predominantly trained for securing air bases. The Centre for Stabilisation Engagement 
was established in 2011 and is responsible for the Danish Home Guard’s international 
tasks, and contributes to Denmark’s international stabilization engagement. Specifically, 
the Centre for Stabilisation Engagement plans, develops, and recruits personnel for 
stabilization operations.94 Danish Home Guard personnel have been deployed as 
instructors in basic military training in Iraq and Kenya, as instructors in developing 
civilian competencies, and as personnel offering maritime advice in East Africa.95 
The Home Guard’s doctrine must be seen in the light of its heritage. The Home 
Guard was founded after the Second World War in 1949 with the sole purpose of being a 
national militia that could support the regular forces in case of an invasion of Denmark. 
Its members would have weapons and ammunition at their disposal in their homes. The 
Home Guard is well integrated into civilian society. Some members have never served in 
the regular forces, but many do have prior experience as active duty military personnel. 
Members all have civilian jobs and thus civilian competencies. The Home Guard relies 
on voluntary work; its members will only be compensated for lost earnings in cases when 
they are called in during regular work hours. This voluntary commitment among its 
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94 Ibid. 
95 Center for Stabilisering Hjemmeværnet, “CDSI Bidrag Til CHV Briefing for Attachesamlingen,” 
(Copenhagen October, 2016). This briefing was sent to the authors via the Danish Defence intranet (FIIN) 
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members produces highly motivated soldiers, and enforces the social contract between 
state, population, and the armed forces. 
The Home Guard does not rely on advanced technology or materiel. Time does 
not allow for training with sophisticated weapons, equipment, or systems. However, 
Home Guard personnel are trained in basic military skills such as marksmanship, first 
aid, and guarding installations. The Naval Home Guard do have high speed rubber 
dinghies with modern navigation and communications equipment that enable them to 
patrol harbors and littoral coastlines. 
The Home Guard is not suitable for combat operations in a highly mobile kinetic 
environment. However, the Home Guard is suitable to protect fixed installations (e.g., 
camps, air bases, and harbors,) as it has helped do in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Many of 
the Home Guards’ civilian competencies and teaching skills make it a relevant asset to 
draw from for capacity building purposes in support of Danish conventional forces and 
the Danish special operations forces efforts. Furthermore, the Home Guard’s members 
have civilian competencies that are obvious advantages when it comes to reconstruction 
work and disaster relief. Given the fact that the Home Guard has 46,651 members, of 
whom about 30% are active members,96 and 15% of the total number are females,97 the 
Home Guard harbors a huge potential as a source of support to conventional forces and 
special operations forces in capacity building. 
5. The Danish Special Operations Forces 
The Danish special operations forces consist of the Danish Special Operations 
Command (DASOCOM) comprising two tactical units: the Danish Land Special 
Operations Forces (Jægerkorpset), and the Danish Maritime Special Operations Forces 
(Frømandskorpset) (see Appendix I). These units each have a combat element that is 
comprised of a number of special operations task units (SOTU) consisting of 8–10 
operators with different functions and skills. The support structure consists of a staff, 
                                                 
96 Active members are frequently involved in active duty tasks. Non-active members are members of 
the organization, but do not actively participate in any Home Guard activities. 
97 Hjemmeværnet “Hjemmeværnet.” 
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combat service support (CSS) and command and information support (CIS) elements, as 
well as a training wing (TW), which focuses on internal selection and training and patrol 
and parachute courses. Both Danish Land Special Operations Forces and Danish 
Maritime Special Operations Forces are fairly small organizations. They are manned by 
experienced and adaptable personnel who provide the organizations with a high degree of 
flexibility. However, the small number of operators makes it hard to sustain long-term 
missions or to conduct a number of missions simultaneously. Assigned missions and 
tasks are usually solved by task organizing. Depending on the task, a task force tailored 
for the specific mission is usually created either within each unit or as a joint venture.  
Since 1991, Danish special operations forces have evolved from having a focus 
on long range reconnaissance and sabotage behind enemy lines to being capable of 
conducting the full spectrum of NATO special operations tasks: direct action, special 
reconnaissance, and military assistance. The Danish special operations forces have been 
deployed to the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa to conduct direct 
action and special reconnaissance missions. Although Danish special operations forces 
were part of the U.S.-led Task Force K-Bar that was deployed to Afghanistan in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, most of the deployments by Danish special 
operations forces have been short-time in support of Danish conventional forces. The 
Danish Government did decide to deploy Danish special operations forces to Afghanistan 
from 2012–2014 to build up the capacity of an Afghan SWAT98-like police unit in 
Helmand.99 This was the first time Danish special operations forces were deployed in a 
capacity building role, marking a new chapter for Danish special operations forces.  
The military capacity building mission in Afghanistan was not a one-time 
occurrence for Danish special operations forces. In April 2016, the Danish government 
decided to deploy a contingent of special operations forces to Iraq to advise, train, and 
support selected Iraqi forces in the fight against the Islamic State. The political focus on 
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99 The Official unit name for the Danish contingent was Task Force 7 (TF-7) and it was placed under 
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placed under the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) 
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stabilization in the Middle East and Africa through military capacity building has also 
had an effect on the training and exercises done by Danish special operations forces. 
Since 2015, Danish Land Special Operations Forces have participated in Exercise 
Flintlock, an annual U.S. and partner force special operations forces exercise in the 
Sahel-region that focuses on training and mentoring African partner units. In 2016, 
Danish Maritime Special Operations Forces participated in Exercise Obangame Express, 
the maritime equivalent of Exercise Flintlock, in Cameroon. The aim of these U.S.-
sponsored—but African-led—exercises is not only to build the capacity of participating 
units, but also to promote regional cooperation to address regional and cross-border 
threats from groups such as Boko Haram and other violent extremist organizations. In the 
Danish context, contributing to these exercises can also be seen as militarily contributing 
to the Danish policy of integrated stabilization approaches in support of the Danish Sahel 
Region Plan 2013–2017.100  
Although capacity building was not conducted by Danish special operations 
forces until the Task Force-7 mission in Afghanistan 2012–2014, most Danish special 
operations forces personnel deployed at least once for this mission, and the annual 
Flintlock and Obangame exercises have added to their experience base. Given a low 
turnover of personnel within Danish special operations forces, experiences can be 
considered more cumulative than for other units. In addition, the personnel recruited into 
Danish special operations forces typically bring experiences from prior deployments with 
other branches of service. Consequently, throughout the organization there is an 
understanding of the demands and challenges of military capacity building. If tasked to 
conduct military capacity building, Danish special operations forces would require less 
time to prepare than other Danish forces and could focus more quickly on the 
particularities of the mission.  
In terms of capacity building, the establishment of the Danish Special Operations 
Command provides a shorter chain-of-command and eases interagency coordination as 
well as cooperation with international special operations forces partners. Danish Special 
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Operations Command’s operational aim is to contribute part of a deployable Special 
Operations Component Command (SOCC). In the future, the framework used to set up 
the Special Operations Component Command might be adapted for capacity building 
beyond the tactical level, to help mentor and advise higher staff functions and 
institutions. However, the Danish Special Operations Command must first focus on 
becoming an efficient and well-structured organization itself before undertaking to help 
develop others. 
As a newly established command, the Danish Special Operations Command must 
build everything from scratch, which takes time. This represents a challenge. A second 
challenge is the fact that while the Danish Special Operations Command represents an 
organizational improvement, the size of the tactical units remains the same. Excessive use 
of special operations forces personnel through back-to-back deployments will eventually 
lead to overstretch and may result in retention issues. This, in turn, can bring a premature 
end to military capacity building missions before local sustainable solutions have been 
fully achieved, thereby jeopardizing an integrated stabilization approach, especially since 
a safe and secure environment is a necessary precondition for other government agencies 
to conduct their tasks. 
In terms of doctrine, Danish special operations forces do not have their own 
doctrine for military capacity building, but follow the principles and guidelines in the 
NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) Military Assistance Handbook.101 
Having a flexible doctrine can be advantageous when it comes to military capacity 
building, since both doctrine and standard operation procedures should be tailored for the 
situation, the specific mission, and the units and organizations involved. For instance, a 
blend of special operations forces and conventional forces doctrine might be required. 
The army infantry background of many Danish special operations forces operators makes 
this feasible, although the inclusion of input from regular army infantry would help. 
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Technologically, Danish special operations forces possess modern equipment and 
materiel. Possessing a technological advantage is usually associated with special 
operations, but when it comes to capacity building of local security forces in third world 
countries, state-of-the art equipment matters less. Technology can provide the training 
unit with better force protection, but if the goal is to help stand up self-sufficient and 
sustainable local security forces, the technology, equipment, and materiel used in training 
must be the same as that which will be available after the mission ends. 
B. CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN 
THE NEW MILLENNIUM 
What makes special operations forces special? NATO defines special operations 
as operations that are not conventional. By describing special operations as everything 
unconventional, this definition creates a distinction by exception, but at the same time 
paints too vague a picture of what special operations are. According to NATO “[s]pecial 
operations are military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, trained, 
and equipped forces, manned with selected personnel, using unconventional tactics, 
techniques, and modes of employment.”102 It can be argued that these same 
organizational and personal characteristics can be found among certain conventional 
forces (i.e., fighter pilots, explosive ordnance disposal personnel, and maybe even the 
modern infantryman on patrol with a small team in the jungle, desert, or mountains.) 
Since certain conventional forces fit this definition, the argument can be made that 
conventional forces are now special operations forces, or at least “SOF-like.” However, 
as Dr. Robert Spulak, Jr. argues: this is not the case,103 and “special operations (and SOF) 
cannot theoretically be defined in terms of specific and unchanging missions, skills, or 
capabilities,”104 but rather must be defined in relation to the special attributes of the 
personnel. In other words, “It is not the missions that define special operations but rather 
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the personnel.”105 This, however, does not mean that conventional forces have not 
evolved. They have actually evolved a great deal, but they have not evolved into special 
operations forces. 
Danish conventional forces have changed considerably since peace support 
operations began in the Balkans in the 1990s. They have evolved from being a force 
primarily focused on responding to conventional threats from the former Warsaw Pact, to 
a force utilizing doctrine as well as tactics, techniques, procedures, and technology that 
were previously the hallmark of special operations forces. Examples of this can be seen 
in their conduct of close quarters battle, night operations, key leader engagements, and 
ability to perform counterinsurgency operations.106  
Special operations forces have not become obsolete in the process. Nor are they 
replaceable by conventional forces. Special operations forces also evolve, and lead in 
development of technology, and tactics, techniques and procedures. These are introduced 
in the conventional forces as they become cheaper, easier to operate, and more 
available.107 This means that special operations forces, as they move forward, may be the 
force most suitable to undertake exceedingly difficult missions. But it also implies that 
some of the missions that used to be executed by special operations forces can be shed to 
conventional forces.108 Subsequently, with conventional forces’ increased capabilities, 
the prospect for integration and collaboration between the two has increased. However, 
all special operations missions do not have the same requirements, and because a 
conventional force is proficient in close quarters battle and operations at night does not 
automatically make it well suited for capacity building.  
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Capacity building requires mature experienced personnel who have a sense of 
cultural awareness and empathy.109 Danish conventional forces have evolved from forces 
largely comprised of conscripts to a force consisting of professional personnel.110 
Furthermore, Danish conventional forces have gained considerable experience after being 
involved in peace support operations and security operations (counterinsurgency) over 
the past two decades. This combination of a very experienced and largely professional 
force makes for mature and experienced personnel. With maturity and experience usually 
comes a greater sense of cultural awareness and empathy, traits that are currently being 
put to the test as Danish conventional forces advise, mentor, and train Iraqi security 
forces to prepare them for the fight against the Islamic State.111 
Unless capacity building missions change significantly, and so long as 
conventional forces continue to evolve, conventional forces should be able to undertake 
portions of capacity building missions previously conducted by special operations forces. 
The overlap between some capabilities also means that conventional forces and special 
operations forces should be able to work together to a greater extent than before. See 
Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.  Overlap in Missions Between Conventional Forces and 
Special Operations Forces 
Because of the different requirements for conventional forces and special 
operations forces, there are conditions that need to be met in order for conventional 
forces to undertake capacity building missions. First, special operations forces and 
conventional forces can partner, assist, advise, mentor, and train different types of units 
depending on the different skill sets required. If the mission is counterterrorism it would 
be relevant for special operations forces to engage with the unit, whereas if the local force 
is a conventional unit conventional forces should be preferred. With their greater 
numbers and thanks to their experience working in and establishing large staffs, 
conventional forces are also likely to be better at building staff capabilities in/with/for 
other nations, a fact that should be taken into consideration when assigning missions. A 
second consideration should be that special operations forces are more flexible, can 
operate in a more politically sensitive environment, and require less logistical support 
than their conventional counterparts.112 It is therefore worth weighing the need for 
political sensitivity and logistical support required before assigning conventional forces 
to a capacity building mission. A third consideration is that capacity building requires a 
high degree of cultural understanding, as well as certain personal and professional skills 
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that come from maturity and experience. Since special operations forces usually recruit 
the majority of their personnel from conventional forces, operators are generally familiar 
with both conventional and special operations. In addition, they have a higher average 
age and more experience. Table 1 highlights the characteristics and differences between 
special operations forces and conventional forces when it comes to some of the 
considerations that should be taken into account before assigning units to capacity 
building missions. 
Table 1.   Characteristics of Special Operations Forces and Conventional 
Forces in Relation to Military Capacity Building Missions 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) Conventional Forces (CF) 
Partner with local SOF or CF Partner with local CF 
Require limited logistical support Require high degree of logistical support 
Used to operating in highly politically 
sensitive environment 
Used to operating in less politically sensitive 
environment 
Small units Larger units 
Rapidly deployable Require more mission-specific training 
Can operate overt/covert/clandestine Only overt 
Limited resource Can be produced in larger numbers 
Highly flexible and adaptable Require more time to adjust training to adapt 
to new mission sets. 
 
C. DANISH EXPERIENCES IN FULL INTEGRATION AND TASK 
ASSIGNMENTS 
Full integration operations and task assignment operations within the Danish 
armed forces are well known concepts, although they have been executed at different 
levels. For instance, full integration has only been used at lower tactical levels. In 2012–
2014 the Danish Army provided a number of enablers for Task Force-7 for a capacity 
building mission in Helmand Province in Afghanistan. These enablers included drivers, 
support personnel, and staff personnel whose use freed special operations operators for 
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more demanding tasks. In the operation to remove chemical weapons from Syria 
(Operation RECSYR) in 2013–2014, the Army and the Danish Emergency Management 
Agency provided engineers with special expertise in handling chemical agents. Naval 
special operations forces provided teams to secure the engineers whenever they had to 
operate on land or on other vessels. However, task assignment has been dominant. In 
Helmand between 2012–2014, a joint conventional force trained conventional Afghan 
forces in Camp Tombstone (Camp Bastion), while special operations forces trained 
Afghan SWAT-teams in Lashkar Gar, and other conventional forces fought in the green 
zone north of Gereshk. Similarly, in Iraq during 2016, conventional forces have been 
training Iraqi conventional forces while Air Force F-16s and special operations forces 
support the fight against Islamic State.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Over the past two decades, Danish conventional forces and Danish special 
operations forces have changed their focus from territorial defense and peacekeeping 
missions to expeditionary deployments in highly kinetic environments. The Danish Army 
has become a highly experienced professional expeditionary force capable of carrying out 
stability and capacity building operations. The professionalization, experience, and 
organization of the Army today enables it to execute operations that were previously only 
undertaken by special operations forces. Elements of the Danish Navy, Air Force, and 
Home Guard have also deployed internationally which now enables them to likewise 
contribute to joint stabilization operations and capacity building. In short, all services 
have units and experience that can contribute to a joint stabilization operation. All 
services have individuals who have served in staff in higher echelons, and have gained 
experience in planning stabilizations operations and capacity building. All services have 
the organization, doctrine, technology, and mindset to enable them to work in full 
integration operations and/or task assignments. However, this still leaves the hurdle of 
how to synchronize and integrate conventional forces with special operations forces, 
since military capacity building is now a pivotal core task of the Danish special 
operations forces. 
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IV. SCENARIO AND CONCEPTUAL SOLUTIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and analyze likely scenarios in order to 
generate optimal approaches to the synchronization and integration of special operations 
forces and conventional forces. The main distinction between the two scenarios we 
present involves level of violence. In one, the focus will be on conflict prevention.113 In 
the other, the focus will be on resolving the conflict. Both scenarios will feature some 
common characteristics. The differences between them will lead to the need for 
somewhat different approaches in terms of doctrine, organization, and technology. 
Historical examples will be used as supporting evidence.  
A. INTRODUCTION 
We do not provide the degree of detail necessary for tailoring country-specific 
solutions to the countries we sketch. Local culture, environment, climate, infrastructure, 
etc., are important factors when determining the exact composition of a task force, but 
taking into account this level of detail on a case by case basis is beyond the scope of this 
study. Instead, our aim is to develop two sets of conceptual approaches that can be 
applied in different conflict environments. Again, although the doctrine, organization, 
and technology of the local partner nation should play a major role in helping to shape the 
nature of a task force, the focus of this capstone is on how to create coherence and 
synergy between Danish special operations forces and conventional forces.  
B. SCENARIO DESCRIPTIONS 
1. Scenario Commonalities 
Current wars in Africa are characterized by high unemployment and weak, 
fragmented, and decentralized administrations, and force is now mainly directed against 
civilian populations.114 Low-cost weapons make conflicts cheap to engage in, and make 
                                                 
113 In the conflict prevention scenario there can still be local conflicts, but this will be limited in size 
or degree of violence and not pose a direct threat to the national government. 
114 Münkler, The New Wars, 2002: 12–14. 
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war accessible to a number of non-state actors, such as warlords, firms, terrorists, and 
mercenaries. This makes it even more necessary for weak countries to mobilize a credible 
capacity that can counter them and strengthen institutions.  
Four megatrends are said to be likely to dominate future conflict-prone areas: 
population growth, urbanization, littoralization, and network connectivity. The world is 
already seeing unprecedented concentrations of populations in Latin America, Asia, and 
Africa.115 As urban cities grow and expand beyond their infrastructural capacity, tensions 
are expected to rise. Power vacuums in megacities and poor governmental outreach will 
create opportunities for non-state actors to establish patron-client relationships with 
sectors of the population. Members of local populations may thus be sucked into a non-
state actor’s web of dependence, from which it becomes hard, if not impossible, to 
escape.  
Littoral megacities are said to be the next primary battleground, and future 
conflicts will take place on the outskirts of urban areas rather than in rural environments. 
Network connectivity via the Internet and media will make the conflicts more population-
centric than ever.116 Meanwhile, traditional urban warfare, where soldiers are deployed in 
order to dominate key terrain, is an extremely costly affair, especially for foreign troops.  
Since it has proven so difficult for military forces to control the physical 
environment in the twenty-first century, dominating the cognitive domain becomes vital. 
This in turn impacts military capacity building because it requires better integration 
between kinetic and non-kinetic activities, especially in the realm of information 
operations. In population-centric warfare, winning the support of the people is essential to 
deal with threats by non-state actors and to create a strong and well-functioning state.  
Winning the support of the population requires that the government be perceived 
not only as legitimate, but also as powerful enough to eliminate or at least suppress 
internal threats, like an insurgency. International support to a government can help 
increase its legitimacy, but a visible military contingent of foreign troops can also turn 
                                                 
115 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of Urban Guerilla Warfare, 2013: 27–29. 
116 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of Urban Guerilla Warfare, 2013: 40–41. 
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out to be a double-edged sword. Foreign soldiers in the streets highlight the local 
government’s lack of capacity to enforce law and order and provide security for the 
population. Their presence reinforces the agenda of the those who oppose the 
government, who want to portray the government as weak and incapable of providing 
security and public services. Foreign soldiers are also likely to be perceived as foreign 
occupiers, a message easily exploited by enemy propagandists, and something that can 
lead to increased support for opposition groups, as well as serving as a source of unity 
among them.117 Two requirements for the effective conduct of military capacity building 
follow from this argument: the local government troops must always be in the lead, and 
the footprint of a foreign military contingent must be kept as small as possible.  
2. Conflict Prevention (Scenario 1) 
The post-conflict period can also be viewed as a pre-conflict period for the next 
round of warfare, as illustrated in Figure 6. Some of the tasks that mark the immediate 
aftermath of a conflict, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration may not be 
needed if a conflict has not yet or recently occurred. However, other preventive military 
capacity building tasks are practically the same, whether we are in a pre- or post-conflict 
period.  
                                                 
117 Edward N. Luttwak, “Modern War: Counter-Insurgency as Malpractice,” Politique Étrangère, no. 
4 (2006): 849–61. 
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Figure 6.  Evolution of Conflicts Over Time 
In conflict prevention (Scenario 1), society is in a state of relative peace, but the 
peace is fragile and latent conflicts smolder beneath the surface, and threaten to erupt if 
left unaddressed. The government is in control in most of the country and enjoys the 
support of the majority of the population. There is no current threat to its existence or 
survival. However, there are small areas in the country where the government has limited 
influence, and local pockets of resistance exist, as do those engaging in criminal activities 
as well as ethnic and tribal tensions. An example of such a scenario could be Nigeria, 
with criminal activities in the central Niger Delta, piracy problems in the Gulf of Guinea, 
and challenges posed by Boko Haram’s terrorist activities in the north-eastern part of the 
country. 
The objective in the conflict prevention scenario is to prevent conflict from 
erupting or re-erupting and to lay the foundation for a more stable peace in the future. 
This cannot be achieved solely by the military, but instead requires a comprehensive 
approach. The role of the military is to provide security as a pre-condition for other actors 
to be able to assist. To achieve viable security, military capacity building must focus on 
long-term effects within the framework of “shape-secure-develop.” Given the political 
necessity of maintaining a small military footprint, the most efficient use of military 
capacity building personnel and resources seems to be to affect military institutions. By 
placing a focus on capacity building of institutions, the efforts undertaken might not have 
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an immediate impact, but over time should create more enduring and sustainable effects. 
An example of this would be to focus on military academies and the education and 
training of officers. The flow of officers graduating and being assigned to different units 
over time, would ideally produce a chain reaction throughout the system, much as with 
train-the-trainer programs, whereby instructors from different units could be centrally 
trained by a small capacity building force, after which they would return to their units and 
disseminate the training and education that they received. Bottom line: The focus for a 
small military capacity building force should be to advise and mentor prior to conflict as 
a preventive measure, rather than to partner and assist during actual military operations.  
3. Conflict Intervention (Scenario 2) 
Conflict intervention, on the other hand, arises when a violent conflict such as an 
insurgency or a civil war has erupted to such a degree that it poses a threat to the 
existence and survival of the government. The conflict is mainly internal, although 
external actors, both state and non-state actors, might be supporting different factions in 
the conflict. Although the fighting might be limited to certain parts of the country, the 
majority of the population is affected by the war. The conflict could have roots in a mix 
of religious, tribal, or ethnic tensions. Examples of this type of scenario can be found the 
fight with the Islamic State in Iraq, the Syrian civil war, or the insurgency in Mali. 
The objective in intervening while a conflict is ongoing is to support the local 
government in overcoming the threat and to establish peace in the country. With an 
ongoing violent conflict and a substantial threat from the enemy, the short-term goal of 
securing the survival of the government might have to take precedence over long-term 
stabilization activities. Figuratively, the focus must be on the survival of the patient, 
before rehabilitation and prevention of further illness comes into play. However, the 
activities undertaken have to establish the foundation for transitioning to a conflict 
prevention environment (Scenario 1), and therefore the planning must be in accordance 
with the “shape-secure-develop” doctrine.  
Time is essential, and one cannot wait for a gradual chain of effects to take place 
through institution-building and train-the-trainers programs. Instead, military capacity 
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building must focus on the units conducting the fight in order to have an immediate 
impact. The training must take place where the local military units are situated, which 
leads to a decentralized solution and the possible need for a higher number of instructors 
to train different units simultaneously. There might be situations when the military 
capacity building force will partner and assist the local forces in direct combat operations. 
In some critical instances, the capacity building force might even conduct unilateral 
military operations at the local level to create the preconditions for inserting a local 
partner force if this force does not have the equipment, training, or air and fire support to 
defeat the enemy. These requirements will naturally result in a military capacity building 
force that has a much larger military footprint in terms of combat support as well as 
combat service support. Table 2 summarizes the requirements for the two scenarios 
described. 
Table 2.   Priority of Requirements for the Different Scenarios 
 
4. Relationship between Scenarios 
The two scenarios described occur in the same general environment, but they 
represent situations at two different ends of the conflict spectrum. In reality, they could 
PRIORITY OF REQUIREMENTS 
Conflict Prevention (Scenario 1) Conflict Intervention (Scenario 2) 
Long-term focus 
(e.g., focusing on creating changes 
which produce a chain reaction in the 
system.) 
Quick impact activities (with a long-term focus)  
(e.g., addressing the tasks at hand, winning 
battles, ending the conflict.) 
 
Prioritize building institutions Prioritize building units 
Train-the-trainer + staff Train-the-shooter 
Advise and mentor Partner and assist 
Small military footprint Larger military footprint (logistics + force 
protection) 
Centralized position  Only 
indigenous forces at the local level 
Decentralized position  Assist/partner at the 
local level 
Locals in the lead and information operations activities 
Shape-secure-develop 
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represent two snapshots of the same country just taken some years apart, since conflicts 
are dynamic and one scenario can gradually evolve into the other. The purpose of the 
conflict intervention is to reduce the level of violence and stabilize the country, thus 
evolving into a conflict prevention scenario. In contrast, the purpose of conflict 
prevention is to avoid a violent conflict from erupting or escalating and leading to the 
need for conflict intervention. In either case the process can entail a gradual change over 
time or a sudden shift.  
The long-term objective in both cases is to create an enduring and stable peace. 
But to achieve this objective requires that the root causes of the potential conflict be 
addressed and resolved. Military means can move a country from a violent conflict 
toward a fragile peace, but military means cannot create a stable peace. This requires 
good governance which involves a comprehensive approach. 
As depicted in Figure 7, the two scenarios are mutually connected, and so must 
the solutions be. In conflict intervention, there must be a plan for how to conduct a 
transition toward conflict prevention. As the scenario gradually changes, so should the 
prioritization of requirements described in Table 2. Most conflict environments will 
involve a mix between the two scenarios and there will be considerable variation 
depending on local factors. Therefore, it is necessary to tailor the solution to the local 
environment and be ready to adapt as the situation changes.  
 
Figure 7.  Relationship Between Conflict Prevention and Conflict 
Intervention 
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C. SCENARIO SOLUTIONS 
1. Conflict Prevention (Scenario 1) 
a. Introduction 
In pre-/post-conflict scenarios there is little need for any direct kinetic 
involvement by foreign forces, and it is imperative that local forces are seen to be 
providing security in order to ensure that the local government is viewed as legitimate. 
Since the threats in this phase are not of an immediate or existential type to the local 
government, there may be public and political reluctance to accept foreign national forces 
conducting combat operations within the country, as was seen when the United States 
deployed troops to the Philippines in 2003 to assist in countering the terrorist threat in the 
southern part of the country.118 Foreign forces should therefore maintain a discreet 
posture focused on advising, mentoring, and training local forces at the institutional level 
in a “train-the-trainer” setup. See Figure 8 for a depiction of the proposed response to 
conflict prevention. 
                                                 
118 The plan to send 1,700 American troops to the Philippines was put on hold because the Philippine 
constitution prohibited foreign troops carrying out combat missions. The Philippine population and 
government objected to the United States’ use of the term “combat mission,” and a spokesman of the 
Philippine president characterized the operation as an exercise in order to re-define the U.S. role. Eric 
Schmitt, “Threats and Responses: Asian Arena; Plan for U.S. Troops in Philippines Hits Snag,” The New 




Figure 8.  Principal Priorities During Conflict Prevention. 
b. Response 
In conflict prevention, conventional forces and special operations forces should be 
fully integrated. This will ensure coherence and unity of effort and command. Moreover, 
it will leverage comparative advantages possessed by conventional forces and special 
operations forces, enhance probability of mission success, and ensure most appropriate 
use of resources. This means that conventional forces and special operations forces work 
closely together. The forces should focus on training the trainer and building military 
institutions so that local forces can utilize this knowledge and conduct “shape-secure-
develop” themselves. The aim should be for foreign forces to maintain a centralized 
position with a relatively small military footprint adopting a low visibility approach so 
only local forces engage with the local people. A successful example of the use of a small 
military footprint to train and assist local forces is the U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom 
in the Philippines from 2001 to 2014.119  
                                                 
119 Operation Enduring Freedom in the Philippines consisted predominantly of special operations 
forces. However, this study proposes that in a fully integrated approach conventional forces can be used in 
lieu of special operations forces in many functions, as they possess advantages over special operations 
forces in some fields. 
 52
c. An Example of Successful Capacity Building—United States in the 
Philippines 
U.S. forces deployed to the Philippines in 2001 in order to assist the Philippine 
government in countering the terrorist threat in the Southern Philippines, mainly posed by 
the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).120 Because of restrictions imposed in the terms agreed 
upon between the Philippine and the U.S. government, the U.S. forces could not engage 
in direct combat action, except for self-defense.121 Therefore, the U.S. forces  
provided operational advice and direct support to PSF [Philippine Security 
Forces] operations against the designated threat groups; (2) they helped 
train, equip, and improve the Philippine forces’ capabilities; and (3) they 
conducted extensive civil–military operations (CMO) and information 
operations (IO) in conjunction with Philippine forces to enable combat 
operations, increase the population’s support for the Philippine 
government and reduce the safe havens available to the armed groups.122  
Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines was conducted as a joint operation with 
participation from all different services. U.S. special operations forces conducted most of 
the training, but conventional forces also played an important role in delivering the 
support needed for the operation.123 The general opinion of the authors of the RAND 
report U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014 is that Operation 
Enduring Freedom Philippines was a great success. The operation reduced the overall 
threat, improved the capability of the Philippine security forces, and ensured increased 
                                                 
120 The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) appeared in 1991 and is a Salafi Jihadist organization based in the 
Southern part of the Philippines. It is said to be fighting for an independent Islamic state and has previously 
pledged allegiance to al Qaeda and recently to Islamic State. Abu Sayyaf Group is responsible for 
kidnappings, hijackings, bombings and beheadings. By U.S. estimates the group had over 2,000 members 
in 2000, but is estimated at around 400 in 2014. The group was not considered an existential threat to the 
Philippine government, but did contribute to instability and undermined foreign investment in the area. 
(Linda Robinson, Patrick B. Johnston, and Gillian S. Oak, “U.S. Special Operations Forces in the 
Philippines, 2001–2014” (Santa Monica, Ca, USA: RAND Corporation, 2016), xviii, 11–13, 
http://www.rand.org/t/RR1236; “Philippines Unrest: Who Are the Abu Sayyaf Group?,” BBC News, June 
14, 2016, sec. Asia, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36138554.) 
121 Robinson, Johnston, and Oak, “U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014,” 
xiii. 
122 Ibid., xiii. 
123 Ibid., xxvii, 33. 
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support for the Philippine government.124 Several contributing factors were said to be 
decisive in shaping the success of Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines: the emphasis 
placed on Philippine sovereignty and Philippine forces taking the lead, and the U.S. 
forces’ very rigorous Rules of Engagement prohibiting any U.S. unilateral action, 
allowing only for U.S. self-defense. This meant that the Philippine forces were seen to be 
responsible for successfully stabilizing the area, which enhanced the credibility and 
legitimacy of the Government of the Philippines, and also ensured that Philippine forces 
did not become overly dependent on U.S. support.  
U.S. forces engaged with their Philippine counterparts from the joint task force 
level to the battalion level at the start of the mission. In the later years of the mission the 
focus shifted more toward higher echelons and institution building.125 Worth noting is 
that the RAND report found that this initial “[t]actical focus delayed institutional 
development and might have contributed to delayed transition,” meaning that had the 
mission focused on training of higher level staff and institutional growth earlier on, a 
transition might have occurred earlier as well.126 Finally, the mission was characterized 
by a small military footprint which was jointly organized and deployed in such a way that 
as to create a synergistic effect.127  
d. Doctrinal Alignment 
Doctrinally, conventional forces and special operations forces must be aligned. 
Not only do different doctrinal approaches exist in the Danish Armed forces, but these 
also differ between countries, services, and alliance partners. In the case of the Malayan 
Emergency, the British forces had to learn the hard way that an aligned doctrinal 
                                                 
124 Robinson, Johnston, and Oak, “U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014,” 
114–22; Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and The Indirect 
Approach,” Military Review, December 2006, 8–9. 
125 Robinson, Johnston, and Oak, “U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014,” 
125–29. 
126 Robinson, Johnston, and Oak, “U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014,” 
123. 
127 Robinson, Johnston, and Oak, “U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014,” 
128–29; Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and The Indirect 
Approach,” 9. 
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approach was needed to achieve the best unity of effort and to effectively combat an 
insurgency. The British did not achieve any real success in Malaya in the early years of 
the Malayan Emergency (1948–1951). This was due to an unaligned organization and the 
lack of a coherent counterinsurgency doctrine.  
An aligned organization and a coherent counterinsurgency doctrine did not appear 
until General Sir Gerald Templer took over the counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya in 
1952 and consolidated the work done by his predecessor.128 In his book The Conduct of 
Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya, Major General Walter Walker sought to capture all 
of the knowledge and experience from Malaya in order to develop a counterinsurgency 
doctrine. By doing so, he contributed greatly to the success of the Malayan 
Emergency.129  
Of course, being doctrinally aligned is never enough. The forces must be aligned 
to the right doctrine. This was the case in the Philippines when the U.S. forces all worked 
according to Foreign Internal Defense doctrine130 and utilized an indirect approach to 
counterinsurgency as captured by Professor Gordon McCormick’s “Diamond Model.”131 
Ensuring that the doctrinal approach is aligned within the organization is imperative. But 
in order to create true unity of effort the forces must also be organized so that they deliver 
optimal output and sustainability. 
e. Organizational Alignment 
When it comes to organization the key is to task organize to fit the current 
conflict. It is likewise important to fully integrate and synchronize all forces under one 
organization. This means that the relevant forces are trained and deployed together, 
                                                 
128 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lesson from Malaya and Vietnam 
2005, 77–81, 88–91. 
129 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 2005, 95–97, 103–7. 
130 Robinson, Johnston, and Oak, “U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014,” 
xiii. 
131 The “Diamond Model” is developed by Professor Gordon McCormick. The model seeks to 
illustrate the conditions and complexity of an insurgency and describe the indirect approach necessary in 
order to combat it. For more on the model see: Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-
Philippines and The Indirect Approach,” 4. Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-
Philippines and The Indirect Approach,” 4. 
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serving in the same organization under the same commander. Part of the success that the 
British had in Malaya is attributed to their unity of command and their ability to integrate 
forces not only internally within the British Army, but also with local police and local 
forces.132  
Beyond the need to fully integrate local forces, if both Danish special operations 
forces and conventional forces are used, they need to be integrated too. One aim of 
integration is to set optimal conditions for sustainability. Since different forces have 
different comparative advantages they can offer different forms of assistance and can be 
deployed for different lengths of time and in different numbers. 
The task force must task organize so that the organization is able to not only 
sustain itself, but also mirror the organization of the partner nation. The partner nation’s 
organization might not be organized according to NATO standards. Therefore, the task 
force must consist of building blocks that can conform and adapt to the partner nation’s 
organization.  
For this particular prevention scenario, it is suggested that forces organize with a 
“functional approach,”133 meaning that the task force must organize according to the 
functions that need to be delivered. These will differ from situation to situation, but for a 
generic scenario, like the one we have described, the following functions are suggested: 
administration, intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, and information 
operations, much like parts of the J1-J9 structure so widely used in NATO. The key is to 
focus on the comparative advantages that each type of force possesses over the other. 
Administration in this context can be thought of as the administration of personnel 
and the conduct of administrative tasks. While conventional forces and special operations 
                                                 
132 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 2005, 104–5. 
133 The term “functional approach” should be understood in the context of organizational theory where 
a functional approach entail that all experts within a field is grouped in the same department. This is 
opposed to the notion of a divisionalized form of organization where the organization is “a set of rather 
independent entities joined together by a loose administrative overlay.” And where each division is an 
independent entity with its own product line and a large degree of autonomy. Henry Mintzberg, Structure 
in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations, 1st edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992), 9.; 
briefing and slide on Henry Mintzberg by Professor Erik Jansen, briefed at the Naval Postgraduate School 
January, 2016. See Appendix B for a graphic depiction of functional and divisionalized organizations. 
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forces share many similarities when it comes to administrative functions, and because 
most militaries are comprised of conventional forces and do not need assistance specific 
to special operations forces in this realm, it makes most sense to use conventional forces 
to assist with administrative functions.  
Intelligence support to capacity building should be a joint venture between 
conventional and special operations forces. Intelligence support serves two purposes. 
First, is to increase operational security for one’s own forces and for local forces. Second, 
is to develop the best possible understanding of the local political and military situation, 
and utilize this knowledge to provide the best possible advice and mentoring to the local 
forces.134 Meanwhile, conventional and special operations forces themselves require 
different intelligence products.135 Consequently, in a joint mission with a fully integrated 
approach, the intelligence branch should be manned by a mix of conventional and special 
operations forces intelligence personnel. This will ensure good mutual understanding and 
that the right and relevant intelligence products are produced. 
When planning and executing operations in which advising and mentoring are 
done at multiple levels, with different types of forces, and in which the focus is on 
institution-building and train-the-trainer, it is important to address the needs of both 
conventional operations and special operations. As with the intelligence branch, 
conventional and special operations forces also have different operational requirements. 
Therefore, the operations branch should include both conventional and special operations 
personnel. 
Logistics positions should predominantly be filled by conventional forces. The 
nature of logistics does not differ much between conventional forces and special 
operations forces. Conventional forces have a significantly larger logistical setup and are 
able to draw upon this experience both internally when supporting the task force, but also 
when advising and mentoring local forces. Also, conventional forces have a numerical 
                                                 
134 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters, “Military Assistance 
Handbook” (NATO, October 2015), 77. 
135 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “AJP-3.5: Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations” 
(NATO, December 2013), 5–2. 
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advantage over the special operations community in relation to logistics, and can spare a 
greater number of personnel. 
Communications positions should predominantly be filled by conventional forces. 
Again, conventional forces have a numerical advantage over special operations forces, 
and can deliver communications assistance with less strain on the organization. 
Communications is often associated with technology and is normally a highly 
technological field. However, the local forces that Danish forces are likely to partner with 
will probably be less technologically advanced, hence there is no need to introduce 
cutting edge technology since this is not sustainable after the mission ends. Instead, the 
task force should focus on low-tech solutions, much as the United States did in the 
Philippines.136  
Finally, successful use of information operations is key when it comes to 
“shaping” the environment. It is crucial to convey to the population that the local forces, 
and thereby the government, are able to provide services to the community. Information 
operations was a distinct “line of operations” in Operation Enduring Freedom in the 
Philippines.137 We believe, that in a pre/post-conflict scenario, information operations 
must be done by local forces. Danish conventional forces and special operations forces 
should advise, mentor, and train local forces in the use and practical implementation of 
information operations.  
f. Doctrine, Organization, and Technology 
As previously described, for the purposes of full integration, conventional forces 
and special operations forces must be doctrinally aligned. Task organizing and mission 
training should be done prior to deploying in order for conventional forces and special 
operations forces to be as integrated as possible from the outset. “Doctrinally aligned” 
                                                 
136 Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and The Indirect Approach,” 
9. 
137 Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and The Indirect Approach,” 
6; Robinson, Johnston, and Oak, “U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014,” xiv. 
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does not mean new doctrine needs to be written. Instead, there must simply be agreement 
about which doctrine to use and which best practices should be fused. 
Among the questions that need to be addressed prior to deployment are: 
 Command and control: who is in command and who does the task force 
answer to? 
 How do the services ensure doctrinal alignment? 
 Budgetary issues: from which command are the funds to be allocated and 
how are the expenses to be divided? 
 Personnel issues: which command is responsible for the administration of 
the personnel? 
 What should be the length of the deployment? 
 
Likewise, equipment needs to be aligned. This does not mean that all units must 
use the same equipment, but it is important that systems, both hardware and software, be 
interoperable. Many units use different systems and different software. When task 
organizing, this issue must be addressed. This can be done through extensive pre-mission 
training, when all of the equipment can be tested and interoperability issues can be 
resolved in simulated settings. 
2. Conflict Intervention (Scenario 2) 
a. Introduction 
Whenever the level of violence, chaos, and civil unrest is high, the primary task 
for the military is to provide basic security for the populace and freedom of movement 
around critical infrastructure and governmental institutions. Simultaneously, remote areas 
have to be sufficiently controlled to deny insurgents the use of these as safe havens. If 
remote areas are not controlled, insurgents will be able to maneuver among the 
population and multiply in number, and thus metaphorically “swim like fish in the 
sea.”138 
                                                 
138 Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Charleston, SC: 
CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2014), 93. 
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Additionally, foreign forces cannot defeat a local insurgency. At best, foreign 
forces can create conditions that will enable local forces to quell an insurgency 
themselves. Foreign forces can offer the local forces critical resources such as military 
hardware, combat support, training advantages, and medical evacuation. When foreign 
force trainers are embedded, demoralized local forces receive a confidence and morale 
boost.139 In Scenario 2 situations (conflict intervention), it becomes imperative to “shape-
secure-develop” the operational environment to set the preconditions to transition to a 
Scenario 1 (conflict prevention). However, “shape-secure-develop” has to be done by 
including local forces from the beginning, with discreet assistance by foreign forces. 
Scenario 2 situations call for an overall task assignment approach, whereby 
special operations forces and conventional forces are utilized according to their core 
capabilities. Due to their ability to operate with limited support, special operations forces 
should predominantly be used in remote areas. Conventional forces should be used 
around vital infrastructure, to include in and around population centers where logistical 
access is important, and firepower will matter.  
Although the Vietnam War is generally considered a defeat for the United States, 
and the U.S.’s and NATO’s success in Afghanistan since 2001 is debatable, there are 
concepts from both campaigns that can be considered to have been effective. For 
instance, the concept of village stability operations utilized in Vietnam and Afghanistan 
is assessed by many to have been effective.140 Analysis of operational mentoring liaison 
teams (OMLT) that trained Afghan National Army units suggest that they, too, were 
                                                 
139 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 2005, xiv. 
140 According to Andrew Krepinevich and Lisa Saum-Manning, there is evidence that the concept of 
village stability operations was effective. The Civilian Irregular Defense Groups program was considered a 
success until the program was terminated in Operation Switchback. (Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Army 
and Vietnam (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 70.)  
Despite challenges and difficulties with village stability operations / Afghan Local Police Program in 
Afghanistan, it was assessed to have been a success according to the decline in the number of attacks and 
the increase in public support. Lisa Saum-Manning, “VSO/ALP: Comparing Past and Current Challenges 
to Afghan Local Defense” (RAND Corporation, 2012), 15–16, http://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/
WR936.html. 
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effective.141 Thus, use of village stability operations and operational mentoring liaison 
teams can both be considered worthwhile for an initial approach in a Scenario 2 
situation.142 See Figure 9 for a depiction of the proposed response to conflict prevention. 
 
Figure 9.  Principal Priorities During Conflict Intervention. 
b. The Use of Special Operations Forces 
The idea behind village stability operations is to create a bottom-up 
counterinsurgency strategy around rural villages. Security and stability are sought 
through the establishment of a positive relationship between the government and the local 
population. As security bubbles expand, and the establishment and solidification of local 
governance is strengthened, villages become inhospitable to the insurgents. If village 
stability operations are executed effectively, village-level governance is eventually 
                                                 
141 Jan Erik Haug, “The Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team Program as a Model for Assisting 
the Development of an Effective Afghan National Army” (Master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and 
General Staff College, 2009), 109, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA502342. 
142 The authors acknowledge that data on unambiguous success via village stability operations and 
operational mentoring liaison teams are hard to retrieve and prove. The Vietnam war is generally 
considered a United States defeat, and the United States’ and NATO’s success in Afghanistan is debatable. 
Thus, there might be critics who claim that neither of the two approaches can be deemed successful. 
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connected to district-level governance, and district governance to national governance.143 
This begins with both special operations forces and local forces living among the locals, 
building relationships, and assisting the locals to resist intrusion by insurgents, while also 
re-empowering local structures.144 
In the early 1960s, U.S. Army Special Forces were used in an unconventional 
manner to organize the rural population of South Vietnam for self-defense against 
insurgents and to promote allegiance to the government. To counter the rising insurgency, 
the U.S. Central Intelligence Service (CIA) created and ran the Civilian Irregular Defense 
Group Program (CIDG).145 Civilian Irregular Defense Group Program militias were 
essential to protect the villages from the Vietnamese communists.  
The U.S. Army Special Forces teams lived in the villages, organized village 
defense forces, and provided basic medical treatment.146 The Special Forces teams 
worked closely with local Vietnamese to build up defense systems and establish 
procedures that would protect their villages. Locals were trained to counter communist 
guerillas, and full-time strike forces were created which could serve as quick reaction 
forces, assist villages under attack, hunt guerrillas, and train other local people.147 
In 1963, the Civilian Irregular Defense Group Program was terminated, when 
U.S. Special Forces where shifted to a more kinetic role in support of the conventional 
forces. Once the program was turned over to Vietnamese Special Forces, they proved too 
ill-equipped, poorly trained, and incompetently led to assume the same responsibilities as 
their American predecessors. As a result, the program collapsed in the fall of 1963, which 
                                                 
143 David C. Ellis, “Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police Bottom-up 
Counterinsurgency” (Headquarters, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan, April 1, 
2011), 8, http://stabilityinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/CJSOTF-A_VSO_ALP_Handbook01APR11-
FINAL.pdf. 
144 Ellis, “Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police Bottom-up Counterinsurgency,” 6. 
145 Thomas K. Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare (New York, N.Y: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 82–83. 
146 Adams, US. Special Operations Forces in Action, 84–85. 
147 Krepinevich Jr., The Army and Vietnam, 69–71. 
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permitted the Vietnamese communists to infiltrate back into the villages.148 This eventual 
failure underscores the need for a sustainable local solution being in place before foreign 
forces pull out. 
Turning to Afghanistan: after the overthrow of the Taliban government in 2001, 
remote villages were utilized as safe havens for insurgents to project violence into 
government controlled urban areas that often were beyond the persistent reach of the 
Afghan National Security Forces.149 After a decade long top-down strategy by the 
Afghan Government, the United States, and NATO, it became necessarily difficult to 
maintain the support of the rural population. However, the concept of village stability 
operations offered a bottom-up stability program that embraced the rural Afghan villages, 
and sought to re-empower local institutions and re-connect them to the Afghan central 
government.  
U.S. special operations forces lived among the people in the villages, and were 
able to address local grievances by re-empowering local tribal institutions to deliver 
security, economic development, and governance. This approach made the insurgents 
irrelevant in the eyes of the local Afghans, because local institutions filled the vacuum in 
which the insurgents had previously maneuvered.150  
Arguably, village stability operations might have been even more successful if 
they had been carried out with local government forces in the lead. Such an approach 
would allow for local people in remote areas to stand on their own feet and connect with 
the central government. But this is often a matter of resources, since government security 
forces cannot be present everywhere at all times and therefore tend to focus on the most 
densely populated areas and key infrastructure. Nevertheless, if local forces executed the 
concept themselves, advised and supported by foreign forces, they could build relations 
with their fellow countrymen and achieve security without needing material support from 
the central government.  
                                                 
148 Krepinevich Jr., The Army and Vietnam, 72–74. 
149 Scott Mann, “Village Stability Operations -101 ‘Understanding USSOCOM’s Role in VSO and 
ALP in Afghanistan and Beyond,’” The Donovan Review, no. 2 (January 2012): 5. 
150 Mann, “Village Stability Operations-101,” 7. 
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c. The Use of Conventional Forces 
Conventional forces are excellent for “clear-hold,” “find-fix-strike,” or “deter-
disrupt-dislocate” operations, and thus play a key role in “securing” the environment 
around critical infrastructure and governmental institutions. However, at the same time it is 
a mistake for foreign conventional forces to unilaterally carry out kinetic or non-kinetic 
operations. In many historical cases, foreign forces have been augmented by a small 
number of local forces, which is wrong. T.E. Lawrence is often quoted as saying that “Do 
not try to do too much with your own hands [because it is] better the Arabs do it tolerably 
than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for 
them.”151  
There are numerous examples from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan of Western 
forces launching operations unilaterally because they were either too impatient to wait for 
the local forces to do it themselves, or because they mistrusted the local forces’ ability to 
succeed; or, sometimes both. One example is the battle of Fallujah in Iraq. In April 2004, 
U.S. Marines launched Operation Vigilant Resolve with four battalions and minimal Iraqi 
participation to “clear” the city of Fallujah that had become an insurgent hot bed, and 
thus posed a significant threat to Iraqi security. The Marines’ massive use of firepower, 
and subsequent civilian casualties generated a lot of criticism from Iraqis and some allies. 
The operation backfired as the U.S. was forced to withdraw. Consequently, the city was 
left to the insurgents who ran it under the fig leaf of a Fallujah Brigade, and transformed 
Fallujah into an insurgent safe haven.152 In November 2004, Operation Phantom Fury 
was launched to “clear” Fallujah again. This time, however, six Iraqi battalions moved in 
behind the Marines to suppress the insurgency.153 The smart preparatory work between 
U.S. Marines and Iraqis paid off because Iraqis did not object to the operation and a more 
effective “clear-hold-build” became possible. 
                                                 
151 T.E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles,” Arab Bulletin, August 20, 1917, Article 15. 
152 Daniel P. Bolger, Why We Lost (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014), 171–79. 
153 Bolger, Why We Lost, 186–90. 
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Bitter lessons learned from involvement in Iraq between 2003 and 2011 indicate 
that the direct approach taken by foreign coalition forces to secure large urban areas was 
ineffective and exhausting. Instead, it has been suggested that more indirect means should 
have been used, such as training and advising local troops in order to increase their 
numbers and competence.154 The rationale behind such an approach is that the local 
soldiers know the local population, the environment, and the culture, and that they should 
do the fighting, but initially will need support, which foreign troops can provide. 
During the campaign in Afghanistan, NATO successfully used operational 
mentoring and liaison teams, which were considered an important factor in the 
development of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Operational mentoring and liaison 
teams performed duties similar to those of the U.S. Embedded Training Teams, and: 
provided training and mentoring to the Afghan National Army; served as the liaisons 
between NATO forces and Afghan National Army units; assisted in planning of 
operations; and provided necessary enabling support, such as close air support and 
casualty evacuation. Operational mentoring and liaison teams were small teams of 13–30 
personnel, depending on the type and function of the Afghan unit they partnered with.155  
For instance, the British Army eventually made effective use of operational 
mentoring and liaison teams in Helmand Province.156 The idea was to provide planning 
and support during combat while the Afghan soldiers took the lead. Insurgents ranged 
along a spectrum from irreconcilable Taliban to young adventure seekers fighting for 
economic reasons. The operational mentoring and liaison teams’ objective was to drive a 
wedge between these two extremes.157 In 2011, Danish ground holding companies 
around critical infrastructure in the Upper Gereshk Valley lived with Afghan National 
                                                 
154 Ucko and Egnell, Counterinsurgency In Crisis. Britain and the Challenges of Modern 
Warfare,156. 
155 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO’s Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs)” 
(Public Diplomacy Division, Press and Media Section, Media Operations Centre, NATO HQ Brussels, 
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156 Anders D. Svendsen, “Author’s notes” (Helmand Province in Afghanistan, July 2011). 
157 British Ministry of Defence, “Army Field Manual Countering Insurgency” (British Ministry of 
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Army units in forward operating bases. Whenever Danish and Afghan National Army 
soldiers went on patrols or combat missions together, embedded British operational 
mentoring and liaison teams acted as liaisons between the Danish companies/platoons 
and the Afghan companies/platoons.158 At this stage of the campaign, the Danish units 
partnered and assisted Afghan National Army units, which gave the operations a “more” 
local “Afghan face.”  
In January 2012, an Afghan battalion executed a “clear-hold-build” operation 
north of Gereshk. The aim of the operation was to “secure” key terrain in order to 
improve and “build” infrastructure, and thus support the locals. The specific objective of 
the operation was to “clear” the land between Gereshk and Patrol Base Line, 10 
kilometers north of the city. Subsequently, Afghan soldiers would build checkpoints and 
observation posts to “hold” the ground and create the preconditions for re-building 
infrastructure north of Gereshk. The operation was planned by the Afghans, and British 
and Danish officers carried out advising. During the operation, Danish units cordoned off 
the area that was to be “cleared,” but the operation was exclusively executed by Afghans, 
mentored and advised by British operational mentoring and liaison teams.159 This 
operation was by and large a success because Afghan soldiers interacted directly with the 
locals, and thus the foreign footprint was minimized. 
Because it is important that overt foreign military involvement be kept to a 
minimum, emphasis in operations like the one undertaken near of Gereshk, should be on 
operational mentoring and the use liaison teams with conventional forces. While 
conventional forces are ideal for helping to “secure” critical infrastructure, they have to 
understand how to “shape” and “develop” the environment. In Scenario 2 situations, 
foreign forces could initially partner with local forces, while embedded operational 
mentoring and liaison teams simultaneously provide both partnered conventional forces, 
assistance, advice, and mentoring.  
                                                 
158 Svendsen, “Author’s notes” (Helmand Province in Afghanistan, September 2011). 
159 Svendsen, “Author’s notes” (Helmand Province in Afghanistan, January 2012). 
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d. Doctrine, Organization, and Technology 
Doctrine does not have to be aligned between special operations forces and 
conventional forces in Scenario 2 situations because conflict intervention will initially 
require that foreign special operations forces and conventional forces operate in different 
segments of the environment. Because their missions usually involve different target 
audiences in different geographic locations they require different approaches. However, at 
the mission’s headquarters level, there has to be mutual understanding about doctrine, and 
as a Scenario 2 situation evolves into a Scenario 1 situation, doctrine will have to be 
aligned. 
Initially special operations forces and conventional forces do not have to integrate 
into a single functional organization, but can operate separately and maintain divisional 
structure. However, they will still have to synchronize and coordinate their efforts to 
realize the mission and facilitate the best possible transition from conflict to conflict 
prevention. At higher command levels and in headquarters, it will be necessary to 
integrate liaison officers from special operations forces and conventional forces in order 
to strengthen mutual understanding, unity of command, and a smooth transition. 
Finally, technology in a Scenario 2 situation has to be fully integrated between 
special operations forces and conventional forces, because combat is likely. 
Technological interoperability is crucial for force protection and for integrating 
command, control, and intelligence. In cases of multinational involvement, 
interoperability is likewise essential. If the technology is fully integrated across foreign 
forces, then local forces will be able to draw maximum firepower whenever needed, and 
utilize updated intelligence for the planning and the execution of operations. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Conflict prevention and conflict intervention lie at different ends of the spectrum 
of conflict. What distinguishes prevention and intervention is the level of violence. In a 
Scenario 1 situation, levels of violence are low and the society is relative peaceful. 
However, the peace is unstable and latent conflicts simmer beneath the surface. In a 
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Scenario 2 situation, levels of violence are high and the conflict has transitioned into a 
full-blown insurgency or civil war. 
Full integration is the approach to take for a conflict prevention scenario. This 
means that special operations forces and conventional forces must be fully integrated in 
terms of doctrine, organization, and technology. The force should be task organized 
according to the specific tasks at hand, comprising a mix of special operations forces and 
conventional forces that can capitalize on each other’s comparative advantages. The task 
force should maintain a small military footprint working with and through the local 
forces. Furthermore, extensive pre-mission training is necessary to achieve mutual 
understanding between the forces, which turns this into the equivalent of a pre-planned 
deliberate mission for which time is taken to ensure that everything is as meticulously 
planned as possible.  
In contrast, the task assignment approach suits conflict intervention. Special 
operations forces should focus on remote areas, and conventional forces should focus on 
freedom of movement around critical infrastructure and government institutions. The 
concept of village stability operations is a logical approach for special operations forces 
to take, whereas embedded operational mentoring liaison teams is the concept of choice 
for conventional forces.  
The solutions offered for both scenarios, as well as for the transitional phase, are 
depicted in Figure 10. In this generic model, full integration is appropriate for task forces 
assigned to conflict prevention while task assignment dominates the conflict intervention 
end of the spectrum. During the transition phase, improved conditions and a less violent 
environment should result in full integration between special operations forces and 
conventional forces rather than a task assignment division of labor.  
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Figure 10.  The Ratio Between Full Integration and Task Assignment 
in Different Scenarios 
However, regardless of the scenario or the approach, the local forces have to be in 
the lead. Military capacity building should be an integral part of both their everyday 
training and their conduct of real life operations, particularly as they use the “shape-
secure-develop” approach to stabilize the local environment. 
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V. ADAPTING THE CONCEPTUAL SOLUTIONS TO A DANISH 
CONTEXT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline actor-specific suggestions for how the 
Danish Armed Forces can carry out military capacity building in stabilization operations 
for the scenarios described in Chapter IV. First, we will compare each of the conceptual 
suggestions with current doctrine, organization, and technology to identify strengths and 
weaknesses. Second, further suggestions for how to overcome deficiencies and improve 
the Danish Armed Forces’ ability to conduct military capacity building will be offered. 
These suggestions will form the basis of the recommendations presented in Chapter VI. 
According to the 2013 report Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement in 
Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the World, Denmark would prefer involvement in 
conflict prevention situations to ensure that conflicts are managed before escalating into 
full-scale insurgencies or civil wars.160 However, in 2016 the Danish Armed Forces are 
predominantly deployed in conflict intervention, where the degree of violence is high.161 
Therefore, the Danish Armed Forces have to be capable of operating in both scenarios, 
but also capable of helping a conflict intervention scenario transition to a conflict 
prevention scenario. 
B. DANISH CHALLENGES IN FULL INTEGRATION AND TASK 
ASSIGNMENT 
Many officers and non-commissioned officers have practical experience in 
partnering, assisting, advising, mentoring, and training local forces. The Danish Army 
has predominantly trained local forces in basic military skills, as seen in Afghanistan 
                                                 
160 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement in Fragile and 
Conflict-Affected Areas of the World,” 12–13. 
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between 2011–2014 and Iraq in 2015–16.162 The Danish special operations forces have 
some experience with military capacity building through the training of Afghan and 
Nigerian forces. However, Danish forces have never executed village stability operations, 
and Danish special operations forces have limited experience in partnering with and 
assisting local forces in the fight against insurgents. Another shortcoming of the Danish 
special operations forces is their limited ability to sustain long-term missions given their 
small numbers and other defense duties. Yet, whether for a conflict prevention or a 
conflict intervention scenario, it is imperative that Danish forces be able to sustain a 
mission over a long period. Consequently, Danish special operations forces will need 
enablers provided by, primarily, the Army, and secondarily from the Navy and the Air 
Force. 
1. Doctrine 
The different services within the Danish Armed Forces are not yet sufficiently 
doctrinally aligned to permit for effective full integration in a conflict prevention 
scenario. This doctrinal discrepancy will make full integration difficult in stability 
operations and capacity building.  
Theoretically, the Danish Armed Forces have the doctrinal foundation to execute 
joint and combined task assignments across the full spectrum of operations. Each service 
encourages close cooperation with other services, and acknowledges the need to approach 
military operations jointly. However, most joint exercises center around kinetic 
operations with an emphasis on the synchronization of fire and movement between 
different services and branches. There is less emphasis on creating a common 
understanding of how best to synchronize and integrate all services for stabilization and 
capacity building operations in the framework of “shape-secure-develop,” whether for 
conflict prevention or during conflict.  
Furthermore, there is no current Danish doctrine that addresses the principles of 
village stability operations for special operations forces or operational mentoring and 
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liaison teams. Nor are there any cross-service doctrine or planning exercises that cover 
how military capacity building ties into a larger plan to transition from a conflict 
intervention (Scenario 2) into a conflict prevention situation (Scenario 1).  
2. Organization 
Danish Armed Forces are not yet ready to set up a fully integrated joint task force. 
With the reorganization of the Danish Defence Command in 2014, the staffs of the three 
conventional services have been located together.163 However, the Danish Special 
Operations Command has been located elsewhere, which not only creates physical, but 
also psychological distance from the other commands. Meanwhile, the Danish Home 
Guard Command reports directly to the Minister of Defence and has the same status as 
the Defence Command, thereby rendering it organizationally disassociated from the other 
services and the special operations forces. 
With the creation of joint agencies and units164 under the 2013–2017 Defence 
Agreement, the Danish Defence has taken a step toward being able to fully integrate 
forces across services. The forces of the Danish Defence are already fully integrated and 
working jointly in the areas of administration, logistics, and communications. However, 
this level of integration across services does not ensure integration and synchronization 
between the different services or between conventional forces and special operations 
forces during deployments. The units themselves still need to work together in one 
organization under one commander and according to the same doctrine. The Danish 
Defence is capable of contributing components to an integrated functional organization in 
the framework of conventional forces and special operations forces, but to integrate 
means they still need to train and deploy together under the same command structure. 
The organization of the Danish Defense is capable of executing task assignments 
across the full spectrum of operations to address a full spectrum of threats. The Danish 
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Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the special operations forces have units that stay at 
medium and high readiness and can be deployed with short notice, but these forces are 
not specifically trained to conduct stabilization operations via military capacity building. 
Additionally, the small number of Danish army units, navy vessels, air force aircraft, and 
special operations forces overall makes it difficult to sustain long-term missions unless 
more units are produced, which entails recruiting and training personnel, instilling 
expertise and know-how and, in some cases, procuring more materiel.  
The Danish Army has three battle groups comprised; each takes turns on being in 
high readiness status. Thus, the Army can continuously deploy a battle group for 18 
months without having to produce new battalions. If the Army is tasked to sustain a 
larger mission for more than 18 months, cadres from the high readiness battle groups will 
have to be removed to form the basis of a new battle group. As a result, all battle groups 
will include personnel on reaction force contracts along with professional enlisted 
personnel.165 The Army is capable of deploying experienced officers and non-
commissioned officers that can form operational mentoring and liaison teams, but there is 
no generic plan for how to produce these teams. Additionally, allocating personnel to 
operational mentoring and liaison teams will weaken the fundamental structure of the 
Army’s battle groups. Thus, if the Army has to engage in either type of conflict 
prevention or intervention scenario, it is important to identify how its current structure 
can be organized to enhance sustainability.  
The Danish Navy has predominantly been engaged in counter-piracy operations 
along the Horn of Africa and capacity building of coast guards in East African countries 
such as Kenya. However, the Navy has little experience in stabilization operations that 
share the characteristics described in both scenarios, which requires partnering with and 
assisting local forces in close integration with the other Danish services.  
The Danish Air Force has predominantly been engaged in air interdiction and 
close support operations, surveillance tasks, and transport tasks in the Middle East, 
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personnel have at least 12 months of training. 
 73
Afghanistan, and Africa. As such, the Air Force has gained experience in joint and 
combined missions with predominantly Army and special operations forces in scenarios 
that require use of one of its platforms. However, apart from the Air Force-led 
operational mentoring and liaison team in Afghanistan in 2009–2012,166 the Air Force’s 
officers and non-commissioned officers do not have much experience when it comes to 
capacity building of local forces or partnering and assisting local forces in either type of 
scenarios. 
The Home Guard has a large potential to play in support of the armed services. 
With approximately 46,000 members, of whom one third are active, the Home Guard can 
become an important enabler in stability operations. The Home Guard Command is a 
joint command that is manned by officers and non-commissioned officers from all 
services and branches. However, the Home Guard is not under the command of the 
Danish Chief of Defence, which complicates command and control, and thus the optimal 
usage and coordination of volunteer personnel in the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and 
the special operations forces. 
Danish special operations forces have mainly been deployed in support of the 
Army on brief deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, and in support of the Navy along the 
Horn of Africa. Danish land and maritime special operations forces also conducted joint 
military assistance operations in Afghanistan from 2012–2014. Unlike the Danish Army, 
Danish special operations forces do not have the ability to quickly produce more soldiers 
to sustain a deployment over time. With a limited number of operators and the challenge 
of recruiting and selecting more, Danish special operations forces can only sustain a few 
deployments for a short duration before having to rest personnel and restore unit 
efficiency. The personnel within the Danish special operations forces are used to 
deploying in task forces tailored to the specific assignment and outside their normal 
organizational framework. This provides flexibility and makes them well suited for full 
integration. However, Danish special operations forces have not conducted training with 
conventional forces for the purpose of capacity building. 
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3. Technology 
Danish Armed Forces are capable of full integration and task assignment from a 
technological standpoint. All services and the Danish special operations forces are very 
technologically advanced and have systems that can communicate together when in an 
operational environment. However, some discrepancies exist in the administrative 
communication systems on which staff work is done. The services and special operations 
forces all share the same internal communication system.167 However, this system can 
only handle up to, and including, the classification “restricted.” The services and the 
Danish special operations forces use different systems for higher classification levels, 
which creates the need for a more streamlined approach to communicating at 
classification levels above “restricted.”  
C. SOLUTIONS 
The two biggest challenges in terms of military capacity building faced by the 
Danish Armed Forces is the problem of integrating forces and the difficulty of sustaining 
missions over a long time. These challenges can be solved by giving military capacity 
building a higher focus and priority in all aspects of training and education, as well as by 
looking into organizational and structural changes that can help provide a higher number 
of qualified personnel when forces are to be deployed in a military capacity building role. 
1. Improving Doctrinal Deficiencies 
Increasing the focus on capacity building in training and education can be 
achieved through structural training and education, general training and education, and 
mission specific training and education.168 Because structural training and education 
focuses on building the theoretical knowledge of the individual, subjects that improve 
cultural understanding, convey theories about different drivers of conflict, and offer 
historical examples of successful as well as unsuccessful military capacity building 
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should be included in the curricula taught at basic and advanced non-commissioned 
officers and officers training, as well as at the joint staff course.169 Instilling the 
theoretical knowledge about military capacity building could provide junior officers and 
non-commissioned officers with a better understanding of the different aspects of military 
capacity building and could also reinforce a shared understanding of doctrine. By being 
able to develop a more thorough understanding of the environment and the background of 
a conflict, it should be easier to use doctrine and apply it correctly.  
General training or education should then build on the theoretical knowledge 
acquired during structural training and education. General training or education can 
consist of activities such as courses, seminars, and different types of exercises. Seminars 
or courses can cover one or more specific subjects related to capacity building, or focus 
on a specific phase of deployment. Seminars and courses can be joint and focused either 
at the individual or at the unit level. Some courses could focus on specific aspects of 
partnering or advising and be customized to provide individuals with a higher level of 
expertise about particular aspects of military capacity building, such as a train-the-
trainers program. Other perspectives and increased mutual understanding of different 
doctrines, procedures, or other subjects related to military capacity building can also be 
acquired through participation in working groups. Seminars can be stand-alone activities, 
or they can be conducted in conjunction with exercises to make sure that everyone has 
the same baseline knowledge. 
Training exercises can help people practice full integration between special 
operations forces and conventional forces. Ideally, such training would focus on military 
capacity building in the framework of “shape-secure-develop.” The planning of an 
exercise should follow the same phases and procedures as the planning of a real mission, 
and it should be done jointly and by the same people who would be in charge of planning 
a real mission. The exercise should focus on staff planning procedures as well as training 
the actual personnel who will be advising during the deployment. Information operations 
                                                 
169 Basic non-commissioned officers training covers NATO OR-6; advanced non-commissioned 
officers training covers NATO OR-7 and OR-8; Basic officers training covers NATO OF-1; advanced 
officers course covers NATO OF-2; joint staff course covers NATO OF-3. 
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should be emphasized in order to learn how to shape the cognitive domain to avoid 
defaulting to kinetic operations.  
Although training different audiences at different levels simultaneously can be a 
challenge, it is possible to do this with proper planning. A comprehensive field exercise 
would provide all participants with a better common understanding of the doctrine and 
the procedures used by different entities. Possible friction points and discrepancies could 
then be addressed in an exercise environment before a live mission occurs. Another 
alternative would be to conduct Command Post Exercises. Only the commanders, the 
staff, and the communication element would be involved, requiring fewer resources and 
personnel than traditional field exercises. The focus would still be on conducting 
integrated planning between different staffs or task organizing a staff with members from 
different services or branches to conduct joint and integrated planning.  
Officers and non-commissioned officers with an appreciation for the different 
elements of culture and the drivers behind conflict, should be able to apply this to a specific 
conflict to understand its dynamics. Exercises should perform a similar function. Having 
conducted generic military capacity building exercises does not mean that mission-specific 
training, education, and exercises are not needed. Ideally, seminars, planning exercises, and 
full-scale exercises should be used in the mission specific phase prior to deploying. 
However, in reality, once Danish politicians decide to deploy troops to a conflict, there is 
often little time to proceed through all of these steps. Therefore, the more baseline 
knowledge everyone has about military capacity building and the more efficiently the 
different staffs, units, and individuals cooperate, the less time it should take to conduct 
mission-specific training prior to deploying. This means that whatever task force is put 
together can either be ready to deploy in shorter period of time or can deploy in the same 
amount of time but with a higher level of proficiency. 
Education and exercises should be structured and repeated on a regular basis. 
Ideally, the same personnel or at least the same units should participate. This will make it 
possible to build on previous experiences and not start from scratch every time with new 
units or personnel. However, even with the same units participating, the natural turn-over 
of personnel will always result in a number of people taking part for the first time. 
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Therefore, having a structure that integrates the doctrinal and organizational lessons 
learned from previous activities is important. Of course, this applies not only to education 
and exercises, but also capturing and maintaining operational experience from 
deployments.  
2. Improving Organizational Deficiencies 
Having a Center of Excellence (CoE) that focuses on military capacity building 
can help collect and maintain knowledge acquired from previous experiences, coordinate 
efforts between different services and commands, and provide military guidance and 
advice the military or even the political decision-makers on issues regarding capacity 
building. To do this, a military capacity building center should be fitted into the 
organizational structure of the Danish Armed Forces. It should include representation not 
only from all the services, but also from each of the branches as well as from the Home 
Guard. Since military capacity building is an integral part of, and often provides the pre-
conditions for, civilian capacity building, the center should have close links to other 
relevant government agencies. One of the tasks for the center should be to analyze 
policymakers’ priorities and identify valid and sustainable military capacity building 
missions that can support these priorities.  
In general, before such a center exist and more studies are done, here is what we 
can say: the general composition of a task force assigned for military capacity building 
would depend on the mission tasks, the hostility of the environment, and the amount of 
support available. Partnering with a local unit in a hostile environment with limited 
logistical, medical, or combat support would normally be a task for special operations 
forces. The same would apply in an uncertain or shifting environment due to the 
flexibility of special operations forces and their ability to work independently with a 
minimum of external support. However, due to the scarcity of Danish special operations 
forces, it is necessary to integrate qualified personnel from the conventional forces to 
support and take over some of the tasks from special operations forces to sustain missions 
over time. Hence, as conditions change and tasks change, so should the ratio between 
special operations forces and conventional forces. 
 78
To be able to fully integrate with other services or with special operations forces 
and conduct military capacity building, personnel should be selected based on the 
following characteristics:  
 Previous military experience 
 High degree of knowledge within their field of expertize 
 Maturity 
 Empathy 
 Interaction and communication skills 
 Cultural understanding/awareness 
 Ability to teach/instruct 
 Ability to speak the local language 
 
Ideally, all of the personnel deployed should have a training or advisory role, 
(e.g., the logistics officer will advise the local logistics officer, the intel officer will 
advise the local intel officer, etc.) The personnel conducting military capacity building 
should be officers and non-commissioned officers since they already have sufficient 
experience to advise, mentor, and train. Optimally, trainers and advisors should also have 
previous operational experience within the field which they are giving advice on.  
The Danish Armed Forces are not structured to conduct capacity building and 
only the Danish Land Special Operations Forces have units consisting of officers and 
non-commissioned officers. However, the Danish Armed Forces have a high ratio of 
officers and non-commissioned officers to enlisted personnel.170 This provides a fair 
number of qualified personnel to select from for military capacity building missions.  
There are a number of different ways to optimize the existing organizational 
structure to meet the demands of military capacity building. One is to create a standing 
unit designated specifically for military capacity building. Establishing a permanent 
capacity building unit offers the advantage of being able to tailor the military force 
conducting capacity building from the beginning, and potentially deploying with a mixed 
                                                 
170 See Appendix J 
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and fully integrated configuration of conventional and special operations forces. Such a 
task force would be able to deploy rapidly either independently or in support of special 
operations forces, only needing mission specific training prior to the deployment. The 
unit could consist of a number of instructors and advisors with expertise within different 
fields of military capacity building, and the organization should be flexible enough to 
allow for task organization for different missions. The organization should also have 
enough depth and redundancy to be able to deploy some personnel on a military capacity 
building mission while at the same time others train new personnel or prepare for the 
subsequent rotation. The unit could be organized either within the conventional forces 
structure, integrated directly into the special operations forces organization, or placed 
under the joint military capacity building center proposed earlier. The latter option would 
be preferable in terms of maintaining expertise and training opportunities.  
Another suggestion would be to create a database of qualified personnel. This 
could either supplement a standing military capacity unit or be a less expensive stand-
alone alternative. When needed, these personnel could form a military capacity building 
task force or be assigned to and deploy with a special operation forces unit. The 
personnel would remain in their current positions, but would have designated functions in 
a “shadow” military capacity building organization, and would be asked to participate in 
capacity building training and exercises. This option would require a longer period of 
pre-deployment training before the assembled task force would be able to be considered 
fully integrated, and might not integrate fully before the mission.  
One disadvantage to “coding” individuals is that the conventional forces would 
have to give them up periodically, leaving their positions unoccupied. This would affect 
unit efficiency and readiness, especially if key personnel were removed from a unit 
without proper replacements. It could also create problems if the conventional unit was 
ordered to deploy. To mitigate these challenges, several qualified personnel would need 
to be designated for each position to ensure sufficient redundancy. 
While the startup of a new mission and the first deployment is usually 
characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, the picture should become clearer with 
subsequent deployments. Those designated for subsequent deployments will have a 
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longer time to prepare, and the experiences and lessons learned from the personnel 
already deployed can be incorporated into the pre-deployment training. Sustainability and 
continuity are key components to mission success. For reasons previously mentioned, it 
can take years to produce personnel qualified for military capacity building missions. The 
exact length of time it takes to become proficient will depend on the tasks that the 
personnel will be responsible for performing. If an instructor is needed to teach basic 
soldier skills, a sergeant with only a few years of military experience might suffice, while 
someone advising on defense structure and organization at a ministerial level or on staff 
procedures and campaign planning should have the rank of major or above, in addition to 
having the right background. The latter type of personnel cannot be produced but must be 
found within the existing organization. However, if such an individual is removed from 
his current unit, this will affect its readiness.  
For these and other reasons, it is critical to ask how the task of conducting 
military capacity building should be prioritized among other military tasks. Procedures 
must be set up to also facilitate long-term sustainment of a capacity building mission. 
Currently, all services use different standards when it comes to the length of 
deployments. The Navy and the Air Force use three-month rotations, special operations 
forces usually deploy for four months, while the Army uses six-month rotations. If full 
integration is to be achieved, a joint task force must be able train together prior to the 
deployment, which requires congruence among rotation lengths over the course of the 
mission. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The Danish Armed Forces are capable of conducting task assignment, but lack the 
ability to effectively conduct full integration due to differences between the different 
services and between conventional forces and special operations forces in the use and 
understanding of doctrine. This qualifies the Danish Armed Forces to conduct military 
capacity building in a conflict intervention scenario. However, being inserted into 
conflict prevention situations or into the transition from conflict intervention to conflict 
prevention presents a challenge for the Danish Armed Forces. One solution is to include 
 81
more education and training related to capacity building in basic and advanced officers 
and non-commissioned officers training. This will help develop a baseline appreciation 
for the generic factors that affect military capacity building missions. At a minimum, a 
common doctrinal approach with emphasis on “shape-secure-develop” and information 
operations has to be strengthened via joint seminars, courses, and exercises. 
Sustaining military capacity building missions over a longer period also presents a 
challenge for the Danish Armed Forces. There is very limited need for enlisted personnel 
in military capacity building, which requires experienced and mature officers and non-
commissioned officers with the right skillsets and personality. The Danish Armed Forces 
have a preponderance of officers or non-commissioned officers, but none are specifically 
designated for military capacity building. One solution would be to create a joint standing 
unit of instructors and advisors that would able to deploy rapidly either independently or 
with special operations forces. Another option, either as a supplement or as a less 
expensive alternative, would be to pre-designate capable personnel who then stay with 
their existing units, but on a regular basis participate in joint training. In both cases, the 
sustainment of a long-term capacity building mission will require removing designated 
personnel from key positions in the existing structure to deploy, which will affect the 
organization’s ability to address other tasks. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Future regional stabilization operations will likely have to be based on 
sustainable, small footprint operations that are tailored to local solutions and local 
problems. Defense cuts, engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan (2003-2014), and current 
international operations have led to an overstretch of resources, which has made it hard 
for Denmark to sustain long duration engagements. Increased sustainability in military 
capacity building can be achieved through the synchronization and integration between 
conventional forces and special operations forces. If the synchronization and integration 
are done right, Denmark will be able to provide and sustain effective military capacity 
building for long duration missions that will prove less expensive than the full-scale 
interventions seen in Iraq (2003-2007) and Afghanistan (2002-2015). 
Military capacity building has become an increasingly integral component of 
Danish foreign policy. Instability in Africa and the Middle East indirectly threatens 
stability in Europe and Denmark. Therefore, the stabilization of Africa and the Middle 
East are in line with Danish and European security interests. Danish forces have primarily 
been involved in conflict intervention. In contrast, stabilization operations demand a 
comprehensive full spectrum kinetic and non-kinetic approach, in which the “shape-
secure-develop” strategy is central. While it is true that countering an insurgency, or 
stabilizing a country or region, demands a comprehensive approach involving: military 
capacity building and security, civilian institution building, economic development, and 
diplomatic negotiations, the military can and should not do it all; it must focus on its 
specific role. Military capacity building is not only a matter of training “shooters” and 
units. It is also a matter of building capacities and military institutions that understand 
how to operate in the framework of “shape-secure-develop,” and can apply both kinetic 
and non-kinetic effects and teach this to the local forces.  
It is useful to outline the principles of task assignment and full integration to 
highlight what it takes to integrate and synchronize the efforts of special operations 
forces and conventional forces in different types of regional stabilization operations. A 
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conflict prevention scenario (Scenario 1) and a conflict intervention scenario (Scenario 2) 
have been used in this study, to set the framework for two conceptual solutions.  
If Danish forces are to be engaged in conflict prevention it is imperative that they 
methodically ensure that underlying tensions do not evolve into a full blown violent 
conflict (Scenario 2), such as an insurgency or a civil war. If Danish forces intervene in a 
conflict (Scenario 2), their aim should be to facilitate the conditions so that the situation 
transitions from conflict intervention to prevention (Scenario 1). With conflict 
prevention, the objective is predominantly achieved through a full integration approach, 
in which conventional forces and special operations forces are fully integrated across 
doctrine, organization, and technology. In conflict intervention, the objectives are 
predominately achieved through a task assignment approach, in which conventional 
forces partner and assist through operational mentoring liaison teams and special 
operations forces do the same via the concept of village stability operations. However, it 
is important to stress that a small, fully integrated element has to be in place from the 
beginning to plan and coordinate the transitional phase. In the transitional phase both 
conventional forces and special operations forces will have to work jointly to transition to 
full integration, which also means that military capacity building becomes an integrated 
part of both everyday training and the conduct of real life operations, in which local 
forces use the “shape-secure-develop” approach to stabilize the local environment. 
Within the Danish Armed Forces there are units and individuals that have gained 
experience and knowledge about how to build up foreign military capabilities. This 
includes the Army, the Navy, the Home Guard, and the special operations forces. 
Additionally, the Home Guard is assessed to possess considerable potential to support the 
Defence Command Denmark. All services have organization, doctrine, and technology 
that enables them to conduct full integration operations and/or task force assignments. 
However, due to a lack of resources, synchronizing, and integrating conventional forces 
with special operations forces remains a major challenge. Synchronizing training and 
deployment cycles and ensuring that a common understanding of doctrine, planning, and 
execution of stability operations through military capacity exists is essential to building 
the framework for “shape-secure-develop.” 
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From a technological standpoint, the Danish Armed Forces are by and large 
sufficiently interoperable to carry out stability operations and military capacity building. 
Thus, the challenge mainly comes down to doctrinal and organizational issues. Our 
analysis based on our assessment of Danish foreign policy, and the capacity and 
capabilities of the Danish Armed Forces leads to the following recommendations: 
 Scarcity of military resources makes it necessary to integrate units and personnel 
from the conventional forces and the special operations forces to sustain long 
duration stabilization missions. Particular conditions and tasks will define the 
appropriate ratio of conventional forces and special operations forces. 
 Practical and theoretical training and education about capacity building has to be 
methodically instilled in the Danish military system all the way from the training 
of non-commissioned officers to the higher education of officers. Material to be 
covered should include cultural understanding, anthropology, knowledge about 
irregular conflicts and military assistance.  
 Seminars and courses have to be offered frequently to disseminate knowledge and 
ensure a common understanding about stability operations and capacity building. 
 Generic training exercises, to include staff work and planning exercises, should be 
held to ensure a common understanding of settings, doctrine, and planning. This 
is especially important for officers and non-commissioned officers who will form 
the backbone of a capacity building mission. Generic and frequent exercises will 
build knowledge and thus provide a solid basis for being able to plan and execute 
real deployments. 
 Seminars, courses, and staff work exercises have to be carried out on a regular 
basis to maintain knowledge and develop tactics, technics, and procedures that 
can be tailored for any given mission in which “shape-secure-develop” and 
information operations are essential. 
 A joint center of excellence that focuses on military capacity building should be 
created. Some of its tasks should be to collect and maintain previous experiences, 
to coordinate efforts between the services and commands, and to provide military 
guidance to senior military and the political decision makers. 
 Personnel have to be selected based on criteria that relate to their advisory role. 
Previous operational and advisory experience must have high priority in the 
organization. The high percentage of non-commissioned officers and officers with 
recent experience from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Africa within the Danish Armed 
Forces provides a pool from which the right personnel for capacity building 
missions can be selected. 
 The Danish Armed Forces should create a dedicated joint unit to conduct military 
capacity building. 
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 The Danish Armed Forces should create a database of personnel with capacity 
building qualifications. By request, personnel with the right qualifications could 
be designated for stabilization and capacity missions. 
 Unit deployment cycles and deployment length need to be aligned between the 
services, which is something especially important for full integration missions. 
 
None of these recommendations will be easily implemented. Some may be 
impeded by structural challenges, a lack of resources, and the nature of the command 
structure within the Danish Ministry of Defence. The command structure between the 
conventional forces, special operations forces, and the Home Guard presents one 
challenge that will have to be addressed. Meanwhile, who is to take the lead on 
stabilization operations through capacity building, and where in the defense organization 
should a military capacity building center of excellence be located? How can Denmark 
create units that are designated for capacity building, and how can the Danish forces 
synchronize education, training, and deployment cycles? If these questions can be 
answered, Danish Armed Forces will move one big step closer to fulfilling the foreign 
security policy objectives set forth by the Danish government.  
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APPENDIX A. DEFINITIONS OF PARTNER, ASSIST, ADVISE, 
MENTOR AND TRAIN 
The terms “partnering,” “advising,” “assisting,” “mentoring,” and “training” are 
defined in this appendix to avoid any ambiguity about their precise meaning in this 
capstone. NATO’s definition of partnering, advising, and assisting are cited from 
NATO’s Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (AJP-3.4.4). In the case of the 
terms mentor and train, these terms are not clearly defined in AJP-3.4.4. Therefore, the 
definitions of mentoring and training from the British Army Field Manual Countering 
Insurgency are used instead.171  
A. PARTNER 
In partnering, foreign units and local forces fight as equal partners, and partnering 
is defined as: 
Partnering attaches units at various levels to leverage the strengths of both 
NATO and HN [Host Nation] security forces. As an HN [Host Nation] 
security force’s capabilities mature, the echelon and degree of partnering 
decrease. As the HN [Host Nation] security force conducts more 
autonomous operations, NATO forces still provide quick reaction forces 
and other assistance as appropriate. Partner units should establish 
combined cells for intelligence, operations, planning, and sustainment. 
While effective coordination is always required and initial efforts may 
require completely fused efforts, HNs [Host Nations] should eventually 
build the capability and capacity to conduct all efforts autonomously. Unit 
partnerships do not replace advisory roles or functions. If partnering and 
advising are used in combination, it forms a three-part relationship 
amongst HN [Host Nation] security forces, advisers and the partner units. 
Partner units should look to the adviser to identify, shape, and facilitate 
operational partnering opportunities and training events. Advisers support 
the Alliance and partner unit objectives but, depending on the operational 
                                                 
171 Other terms related to capacity building, such as augment, monitor, liaise, lead, equip, and 
organize, can be found in various doctrines and literature, but since they are not used in this capstone, we 
are not addressing them here. 
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phase, the partner unit may support advisers or advisers may support the 
partner unit.172 
B. ASSIST 
According to NATO doctrine: “Assisting is providing the required supporting or 
sustaining capabilities so HN [Host Nation] security forces can meet objectives and the 
end state. The level of advice and assistance is based on conditions and should continue 
until HN [Host Nation] security forces can establish required systems or until conditions 
no longer require it.”173 It “consists of providing the required supporting or sustaining 
capabilities so the HNSF [Host Nation Special Forces] can meet their objectives.”174  
C. ADVISE 
Advising aims to have local forces carry out their own planning and execution of 
missions, only supported by advice from qualified personnel and is defined as: 
Advising is the primary type of training conducted with HN [Host Nation] 
security forces. Advising is the use of influence to work by, with and 
through HN [Host Nation] security forces. This type of training relies on 
the ability of the adviser to provide relevant and timely advice to HN 
[Host Nation] security forces... Advisers are not partners. Advising and 
partnering are complementary but inherently different activities. Advising 
requires relationship building and candid discourse to influence the 
development of a professional security force. Partnering incorporates 
training with combined operations to achieve the same goals. Advisers 
perform partnership-shaping functions, shape discussions with their 
counterparts and create opportunities for the partner units.175 
                                                 
172 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) (AJP-
3.4.4),” 5–25. 
173 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) (AJP-
3.4.4)” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization Allied Publication, February 2011), 5–23. 
174 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters, “NATO Special Operations 
Forces Military Assistance Handbook 1st Study Draft” (NATO Special Operations Forces Headquarters, 
July 2014), 1–8. 




The lines between mentoring and advising can be blurry. However, foreign forces 
have a more passive role when they are being mentored. The focus is to guide, council, 
support or direct indigenous armed forces on the best practice to be adopted in particular 
prescribed circumstances. Mentoring will usually focus on assisting the indigenous armed 
forces to improve their own systems and processes.”176 
E. TRAIN 
When foreign forces train, they typically teach local forces directly in accordance 
with technical and tactical manuals, and aim “to deliver military instruction direct to 
indigenous forces in order to achieve a given state of objective. Where possible, 
consideration must be given to Training the Trainer (T3).”177 
  
                                                 
176 British Ministry of Defence, “Army Field Manual Countering Insurgency” (British Ministry of 
Defence, January 2010), 10-NaN-1. 
177 British Ministry of Defence, “Army Field Manual Countering Insurgency,” 10-NaN-1. 
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APPENDIX B. FUNCTIONAL AND DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE 
 
Figure 11.  Depiction of Functional and Divisional Structure178 
 
  
                                                 
178 Adapted from Richard Daft, Organization Theory and Design (Cengage Learning, 2006), 101. 
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APPENDIX C. DANISH MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 
Figure 12.  Organization of the Danish Ministry of Defence179
179 Source: “Organisation of the Ministry of Defence,” Ministry of Defence, January 2016, http://www.fmn.dk/eng/Aboutus/agencies/Pages/danish-mod-
agencies.aspx 
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APPENDIX D. DEFENCE COMMAND DENMARK 
 
Figure 13.  Organization of Defence Command Denmark180 
                                                 
180 Source: “Defence Command Organization,” Defence Command Denmark, August 2016, http://www2.forsvaret.dk/eng/Organisation/Pages/
Organisation.aspx 
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APPENDIX E. ROYAL DANISH ARMY 
 









                                                 
181 Source: Adjutant of the Danish Chief of Defence, “Standardbriefing Tilrettet Forsvaret,” 
(Copenhagen July 15, 2015). This briefing is a standard briefing on Defence Command Denmark and its 
organization. It was made for the Danish Chief of Defence. It has been provided to the authors by the 
adjutant of the Danish Chief of Defence. 
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Figure 15.  Depiction of the Danish Battle Group182 
                                                 
182 Source: Adjutant of the Danish Chief of Defence, “Standardbriefing Tilrettet Forsvaret,” 
(Copenhagen July 15, 2015). This briefing is a standard briefing on Defence Command Denmark and its 
organization. It was made for the Danish Chief of Defence. It has been provided to the authors by the 
adjutant of the Danish Chief of Defence. 
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APPENDIX F. ROYAL DANISH NAVY 
 
Figure 16.  Organization of the Royal Danish Navy183 
  
                                                 
183 Source: “The Royal Danish Navy,” Defence Command Denmark, May 2016, 
http://www2.forsvaret.dk/eng/Organisation/Navy/Pages/Navy.aspx 
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APPENDIX G. ROYAL DANISH AIR FORCE 
 
Figure 17.  Organization of the Royal Danish Air Force184 
                                                 
184 Adapted from “The Royal Danish Air Force,” Defence Command Denmark, May 2016, http://www2.forsvaret.dk/eng/Organisation/AirForce/Pages/
RoyalDanishAirForce.aspx 
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APPENDIX H. DANISH HOME GUARD 
 
Figure 18.  Organization of the Danish Home Guard185
                                                 
185 Adapted from “The Danish Home Guard,” Hjemmeværnet, http://www.hjv.dk/sider/english.aspx  
 106
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 107
APPENDIX I. DANISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
 
Figure 19.  Organization of the Danish Special Operations Forces186 
  
                                                 
186 Adapted from: “Defence Command Organisation,” Defence Command Denmark, August 2016, 
http://www2.forsvaret.dk/eng/Organisation/Pages/Organisation.aspx 
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APPENDIX J. DANISH DEFENCE PERSONNEL 
Table 3.   Distribution of Personnel in the Danish Defence187 
 
                                                 
187 Source: Defence Personnel Organisation (FPS-RA-MS01), in discussion with authors, October 7, 2016. 
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